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THE MORAL LABYRINTH OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
JAMES R. ELKINS*
INTRODUCTION
There is no hiding the problem with lawyer ethics. It is a problem
we see in law offices, courtrooms, law school classrooms, daily
newspapers and magazines,' and on network television. The
problem, put simply, is this: Lawyers sometimes act as if they are not
bound or limited by the most basic tenets of ordinary morality. The
issue has also been raised in medical ethics, by moral philosophers
concerned with professional ethics, and by commentators on ethics in
public life. 2 It is a problem many lawyers worry about, and talk
about; a problem we sometimes try earnestly to fix.' Even so, we have
Copyright © 1992, James R. Elkins.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A. 1967, J.D. 1971,
Kentucky; LL.M. 1975, Yale.

L See, e.g., David A. Kaplan with Ginny Carrol, How's Your Lawyer's
Left Jab?A New Crackdown on Slimeball Litigation Tactics, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
26, 1990, at 70 (discussing the debate over new "courtesy" codes for lawyers).
2. It is this notion that ordinary and professional morality can take
different paths that has become a central focus of the academic literature on
professional ethics. See, e.g., David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A
PhilosophicalResearch Programfor Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REv. 451, 462-70
(1981). Robert M. Veatch, Medical Ethics: Professionalor Universal, 65 HARV.
THEOLOGICAL REV. 531 (1972); Benjamin Freedman, A Meta-Ethics for
ProfessionalMorality, 89 ETHICS 1 (1978); Mike W. Martin, Rights and the MetaEthics of ProfessionalMorality, 91 ETHICS 619 (1978); ALAN GOLDMAN, THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980); Public and Private
Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY, 23-53 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).

3. One way to deal with the problem is simply to accept it. Or we can try
to explain it away. The argument goes like this: There have always been
incompetent and unethical lawyers and the only reason we appear to have more
today is that there are more lawyers. Another effort goes like this: There are no
more unethical and uncaring lawyers than there are physicians or journalists.
Arguments such as these are used to convince ourselves that the problem is not
as bad as it seems. Another way to deal with the problem is to try to understand
it. Consider the following, recent effort:
Lawyers who take justice seriously as the object of their work are in a
"terrible bind"-a predicament connected to larger problems of life in an
age of deconstruction ....

[D]espite the temptation to despair, we

continue to dream dreams of justice and yearn for new, more enduring
constructs of law. Contemporary experience tells us that consensus
about constructs of law is unlikely to emerge. We must seriously
(continued)
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trouble understanding what the problem of lawyer ethics is and what
efforts might be responsive to the ills we hear diagnosed.
You do not have to be a philosopher, sociologist, or psychologist to
know that being a lawyer in these troubled times is difficult. If you
read newspapers, watch television, or talk to your neighbors, you are
faced with the public's ambivalence toward lawyers, an ambivalence
that finds lawyers and their ethics the subject of jokes and cartoons
while at the same time we are also viewed as cultural heroes. If you do
not already know this about lawyers, you may find yourself drinking
coffee one day and read in your local morning newspaper the results
of yet another poll that puts in graphic form the low regard that the
general public has for lawyers and their ethics. It is disconcerting to
learn that lawyers are held in the same regard as used car salesmen
and politicians.
Edmund D. Pellegrino, a physician, finds that
[t]he professions today are afflicted with a species of moral
malaise that may prove fatal to their moral identities and
perilous to our whole society. This malaise is manifest in a
growing conviction even among conscientious doctors,
lawyers and ministers that it is no longer possible to practice
their professions within traditional ethical constraints.4
Students of law are introduced to an effect of this malaise when
they are warned, by someone in their family, church, or town, that
going to law school is a test of a person's moral character.' Others
experience the malaise first-hand during law school when they
realize the moral drift of their legal education and that they are not
going to receive guidance in their struggle to understand the relation
of law and justice. Many students puzzle over how to retain their

consider how to live as a people in the midst of widespread political
dissensus. The heart of the matter is that in law, as in life, we are left
with dreams of justice and without a hard rock of foundation for acting
on our dreams.
Howard J. Vogel, In the Cause of Justice:Reflections on Robert Cover's Turn
Toward Narrative,7 J. L. AND RELIGION 173, 177 (1989).
4. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Character,Virtue and Self-Interest in the Ethics
of the Professions, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 53 (1989).

5. Many law students are warned by someone they know against coming
to law school, and advised, in no uncertain terms, not to become a lawyer. And
yet, we make the decision to become lawyers and assume that we can do so and
still be good persons.
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ordinary moral sensibilities as they make their way into the legal
profession.6
One way to ignore the moral problem of lawyers and their ethics is
to engage in the kind of discourse that makes us, as insiders, reject
what the public, as outsiders, already knows: the ethics of lawyers
may not deserve the name ethics. Our professional ethic and ethos, in
particular the adversarial ethic and ethos it has spawned, has gotten
us into something of a mess. We need, I think, to understand the
mess we are in before we can begin to respond to what Pellegrino
diagnoses as "moral malaise". We cannot afford, morally or
psychologically, to ignore the "problem" of professionalism.
Lawyers sometimes assume that the practice of law is per se an
embodiment of a moral life. Many lawyers and law students take it
for granted that the adversarial ethic can provide the foundation for
their moral lives.' Adversarialism is accepted as an uncontestable
"good", a pragmatic means to justice. It is this same adversarial
ethic that fuels an illusion, professionally supported, that so long as
lawyers represent the "legal" interests of their clients they should be
free from moral scrutiny. Lawyers are quick to turn a deaf ear to
criticisms and critiques of adversarialism. We assume those who
critique and criticize fail to understand the legal profession and how
it serves a "system" of justice. We are quick to reject criticism,
including, ironically the criticism embodied in ethics itself.
6. Law students also confront professional "moral malaise" first hand in
their work with lawyers before they graduate. The depth of this moral malaise
has now been documented.

See Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law

Office Work on the Formation of Law Students' Professional Values:
Observation,Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 537 (1991).

7.

This is the way one judge put it:

The Rules of Professional Conduct purport to govern the minimal level
at which lawyers must operate within the system. They provide a
lowest common denominator approach to good practice. They assume
as a first principle that the lawyer is a champion on behalf of his clientthat is the essence of advocacy. The lawyer is to advance the interest of
his client zealously within the bounds of the law.

Frederick J. Martone, Adversary Adjudication on Trial, 21 ARiz. ST. L. J. 227,
228 (1989) (The author was, at the time this statement was published, associate
chief presiding judge, Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County, Phoenix,
Arizona). Judge Martone goes on to point out that lawyers have responsibilities,
under existing ethical rules, that extend beyond the client. Even so, "many
lawyers have a one-dimensional view of the adversary system. They think their
role is limited to advancing their clients' interests in a zealous way. Their role as
an officer of the court has become a metaphor with little substance." Id. at 233.
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Within the legal profession we assume that lawyers are actively
engaged in productive work; we fantasize that our work as lawyers
makes the world a better place to live. We believe, as lawyers, that we
are "progressive" and "moral" (in the social and political sense that
these terms imply). These implicit notions, notions we take for
granted, shield us from the troubling moral implications of the
adversarial ethic.

Our claims of "goodness" as lawyers cannot be taken seriously if
they double as rationalizations for hardball litigation tactics (by
which we make life miserable for our colleagues in hopes of
improving the odds of "winning" the case),8 leveraging a client's
interest by resort to false claims and perverted readings of legal texts,
seeking unwarranted delay to pressure opposing parties, and the
willful abandonment of civility and civic responsibility. When it

becomes a guise for amorality, relativism, and self-deception the
adversarial ethic, played to its limits, can prove to be an unreliable
foundation for a virtuous life. The adversarial ethic at the heart of the
lawyer's partisan role becomes a source of pathologies of character

that deform the legal persona.' The lawyer who adopts the ethic of
8. Zealous advocacy that tests the moral limits of the zeal as a professional
virtue we call zealousness now has its own label-"hardball". See Charles W.
Joiner, Our System of Justice and the TrialAdvocate, 24 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 15-19
(1989) (The author is Senior United States District Judge, Eastern District of
Michigan.). Judge Joiner describes advocacy as hardball when it is "used to
subvert the process of finding facts expeditiously and inexpensively [and] to
divert the search for truth." Id. at 15. Judge Joiner presents the following
examples of hardball advocacy: abuse of the discovery process, harassment of
truthful witnesses, damaging an opponent's case by delaying trial, using
evidence that will confuse the jury. Judge Joiner argues that these well-known
tactics should be condemned. Id. at 17. Judge Joiner argues for condemnation
of hardball tactics on grounds of fairness and defense of the "system".
"Hardballers, by their actions in the name of advocacy, if not reigned in, would
destroy the adversary system created by society to do justice through
advocacy." Id. at 19.
9. Thomas Huff, The Temptations of Creon: PhilosophicalReflections on
the Ethics of the Lawyer's ProfessionalRole, 46 MoNT. L. REV. 47 (1985) Huff
argues that lawyers are subject to a variety of temptations:
There are, of course, the usual temptations of private gain manifest in
laziness, dishonesty, or thievery.... More often, however, if there are
moral errors which tempt you, they are errors of professional role
rather than errors of private gain. They show up as failures of ethical
insight and moral sensitivity. It is the kind of moral error which comes
from too great an identification with role....
(continued)
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zealousness as a single, paramount, ultimate virtue is the subject of
this essay.
Is it possible to be a good person and a good lawyer if your ultimate
moral principle is permeated with an adversarial ethic limited only
by the outer limits of the law? If we are to understand the proudest and
saddest moments in our lives as lawyers-and the disdain the public
has for lawyers and we have for each other as lawyers-then we must
confront and reflect on the moral notions, role images, rhetorics,
metaphors, and alluring stories that make hardball tactics a common
part of lawyering. Zealousness goes to the heart of what lawyers are
about-it is, as all of us know, and as students of law argue so
fervently, the job of lawyers to be zealous. (Having a job and doing a
job still means something in America!) Zealousness is a trait we
associate with the good lawyers. Being zealous is something that
many lawyers learn without reflection. It seems a little absurd to
imagine a lawyer asking, "How zealous do I want to be in this case?"
When lawyers earn their money, live up to the ideals of the
profession, and gain the admiration of other lawyers, they act as
zealous advocates. When lawyers are less than zealous in their
advocacy, there is, from the perspective of both insider and outsider, a
sense of failure.
Lawyers take pride in zealous advocacy. It is not something we
lawyers do simply because it is demanded of us. It is something we
demand of ourselves. We demand it of ourselves in a way that is as
much internal (and psychological) as it is external (and
sociological). It is part of the ritual of lawyering, grounded in the
ethos and ethic of lawyering. We internalize the notion of zealous
advocacy, it becomes a habit and a way of life. Our best virtues are
those we enact as a matter of habit. The habit of zealousness is
internalized as a way of knowing I° and embedded in our sense of
professionalism.
When zealousness becomes part of our ritual life as lawyers, it
takes on a double-edged meaning. First, we do it without thinking
(zealousness is who we are) and we become the best that we can be as
lawyers. Second, we do it and we become the kind of lawyer the public
has learned to hold in disdain. We become active participants in the
"moral malaise" of the profession.
In this essay, I explore the moral conundrum posed by zealousness
and how habituated responses to zealousness mask an impoverished,
pathological strain of the adversarial ethic. We may find that our
Id. at 47.
10. PARKER J. PALMER, To KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN 21 (1983) ( "The
shape of our knowledge becomes the shape of our living ...").
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faith in zealousness has blinded us to its moral costs. If so, we might
listen as lawyers and those who have set out to be lawyers verbally
rehearse the scripts used to embrace a morally impoverished ethic.
We can, if we look steadily, see how our rhetorical responses to the
moral tests posed for us by zealousness became symptoms of character
gone astray. It is this confrontation and stance toward the power and
pathology of the adversarial ethic that implicates our judgment and
character as lawyers.
I.

Atticus Finch, the Maycomb, Alabama lawyer in Harper Lee's
novel To Kill a Mockingbird, provides a wonderful literary example
of the internalization of zealousness and its ritual re-appearance in a
virtuous act of courage. 1 Appointed by Judge Taylor to represent Tom
Robinson, a black man charged with the rape of a white woman in the
1930s, Atticus does not "decide" how zealous to be in his representation
of Robinson. From what we learn about Atticus, it is not a decision to
be made.'2 Atticus represents Tom Robinson zealously because his
character, as person and lawyer, makes it impossible for him not to do
for Tom Robinson what he would do for any client or neighbor who
sought his services. It is this kind of zeal and this kind of devotion to
advocacy that makes a good lawyer someone to revere even as we
laugh at the lawyers made the butt of common jokes.
11. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
12. While the representation of Tom Robinson may have been the most
difficult case of his legal career, Harper Lee does not present Atticus to us as a
man who struggled over the decision to do what he did. The implication (at
least in its literary portrayal) is that Atticus knew what to do, knew what must be
done, and did it. He did not weigh the possibilities and dangers of accepting the
appointment. We might imagine what Atticus did as "rational", but not rational
in the sense of weighing possibilities, considering feasible alternatives,
projecting costs, and evaluating outcomes. Atticus was rational but not a
decisionist. He did not see the Tom Robinson case as the kind of quandary we
use to teach legal ethics in law school. Near the end of the novel Atticus faces a
more traditional law school version of an ethical quandary when he learns that
Boo Radley, instead of Jem, his son, has killed Bob Ewell. The dilemma is
whether to protect the reclusive Boo Radley or let the "truth" be known about
Bob Ewell's death. Harper Lee has told the story of Atticus as a lawyer known
by his virtue and character rather than his problem-solving and decisionmaking. On the moral philosophical grounds of this shift in focus from ethical
problem-solving to virtue and character, see EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, QUANDARIES
AND VIRTUES: AGAINST REDUCTIVISM IN ETHICS (1986); STANLEY HAUERWAS,
VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION (1981); THOMAS
L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987).
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In the account of Tom Robinson's trial the following conversation
takes place among regulars of the Maycomb courthouse "club" on the
day the trial begins:
"....

thinks he knows what he's doing," one said. "Oh-h

now, I would not say that," said another. "Atticus Finch's a
deep reader, a mighty deep reader."
"He reads all right, that's all he does." The club
snickered.
"Lemme tell you somethin' now, Billy," a third said,
"you know the court appointed him to defend this nigger."
"Yeah, but Atticus
aims to defend him. That's what I do
13

not like about it.'

Atticus, from what we are told and what we know about his
character (not just what we read but what we know) will represent
Tom Robinson zealously notwithstanding the virulent racism of the
courthouse regulars. We do not need anyone to tell us that Atticus did
the right thing and that it would have been wrong to succumb to the
cynicism, hypocrisy, and bigotry necessary to have done less. (I say
"we" can share in this conclusion while I suspect that there are those,
for reasons all too common, who resist even this minimal attempt at
moral consensus.)
Atticus' zealousness on behalf of Tom Robinson is a matter of
habit and character, found in a story of a lawyer whose character
cannot be bought by either the fear of what his neighbors will think or
by the fact that his children may suffer ridicule. Atticus lives in a
racist community, a community that makes it hard to be a good
neighbor. Some Maycomb residents (we do not know how many)
think that Atticus, rather than racism, is the problem. This means
that Atticus cannot represent Tom Robinson without danger to
himself and his family.
If Atticus' story has bearing for us today, and I contend that it
does, 4 we might speculate that there will be times when it takes raw
courage (and times when courage must be refined and crafted) to be a
zealous lawyer, to stand up to a community hell-bent on doing the
wrong thing. Atticus' habit of zealousness requires courage. It takes
the courage of character to stand up to a community, to do what Atticus
did and what lawyers are so often asked to do.

13. LEE, supra note 11, at 165-66.
14. On the concerns of those who do not see the releyance of Atticus Finch
to today's lawyers, see section XIII infra.
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Zealous advocacy for Atticus Finch is a matter of telling the truth.
The truth is that Tom Robinson did not rape Mayella Ewell. Even
truth will not be enough to save Tom Robinson from the savage
indifference to human decency and moral blindness that racial
bigotry has produced in Maycomb, Alabama."6
Atticus is a hero because he stood by Tom Robinson and did so in a
way that allowed Tom to show his character and his courage, a moral
stance that turned out to be far more costly for Tom than for Atticus (as
the truth is always more costly for those who are marginalized by a
dominant culture).
Today, in communities around the country, there are lawyers who
have the courage and the character to do what Atticus did for Tom
15. Tom Shaffer argues that Atticus Finch is a hero because he is able to tell
the truth to Maycomb about the prejudices of his community.
See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. Pirr. L.
REV. 181 (1981). And how do we know that Atticus was telling the truth? How
do we know that racism is morally wrong? I argue that racism is wrong today

and was wrong in Maycomb. It was as morally wrong in Harper Lee's fictional
Maycomb, Alabama, over a half century ago as it is Brooklyn or Forsythe,
Georgia today. We know racism was wrong in Alabama because Atticus, Miss
Maudie, Sheriff Tate, and Judge Taylor are there to tell Maycomb (and us)
about racism and what it cost a community. We do not have to be moral
absolutists to believe that something we know is wrong today was equally
wrong fifty years ago when we have those like Atticus to show us the errors in
our misguided ways. Even so, no discussion of Atticus Finch's moral character
is complete until we are reminded (by some innocent moral relativist) that we
can never say that a community like Maycomb, existing in a different historical
period, was wrong to believe as it did. One wonders about the possibilities of
moral discourse, on something as subtle as the limits of zealousness, when we
cannot agree that racism is insidious and pernicious, if not down-right evil.
How can we talk about zealousness and think about the character we take on
when we internalize the zeal of advocacy when relativism is our guiding frame
of reference? How is Atticus Finch's character to have any meaning to a reader
who thinks that our moral situation today has so improved that we are now
outside the circle of meaning encoded in Atticus's story? One student, when
confronted with Atticus, contended that Atticus would not know what to do if he
faced the kind of problems that lawyers face today!
And what would any talk about the moral limits of zealousness mean to a
reader of To Kill a Mockingbird who thinks that it is nonsense to hold Atticus
Finch as a hero? What would it mean to a reader of To Kill a Mockingbird who
concludes that Atticus is indeed a moral hero, but only because he is "fictional",
he is of "literary interest" is of no practical significance to those who do their
lawyering in the "real world"? Or what would Atticus mean to a reader who
looks at the "progress" in race relations since the 1930s in Maycomb, Alabama,
and argues that we have less need today for the kind of courage than a 1930's
era Southern lawyer needed?
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Robinson. When we think about Atticus doing what he did, and what
he had the character to do, we think best of ourselves as lawyers, and
when we think this way of ourselves we are entitled to the moral
acclaim that one is due as a zealous advocate.
Because Atticus internalized the ethic of zealousness and
reconciled it with the person he was, he was able, without anguishing
over it, to tell the truth and withstand the pressure exerted on him as he
stood against the racists (including neighbors and family members)
in his community. One reason we educate lawyers to internalize the
zeal for advocacy is so they can be zealous about truth when it is costly
to do so. When advocacy becomes part of our character, as it was for
Atticus, we are more likely to know what the truth is and how to tell it
when the time comes. As Tom Shaffer and his colleague, the
theologian Stanley Hauerwas, said of Sir Thomas More (drawing on
Thomas Bolt's story of More in A Man for All Seasons) 6 we need the
skills to speak truth to power.'7
The problem, of course, is that this same zeal, twisted and
perverted, becomes not a source of deserved pride, but a sword turned
against colleague and community, a shield against moral criticism.
II.
A real estate developer seeks to use a badly drafted historical
preservation law to destroy a city block of old historical homes.' 8 Can
16.

ROBERT BOLT, AMAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962).

17.

Stanley Hauerwas and Thomas L. Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas

More, 54 NOrRE DAME LAW. , 569 (1979).
18.

I present the dilemma here in bare form. One response to the problem

is that we need more information before we can make a decision as to the moral
consequences of representing the real estate developer. Another response is that
additional factors are unimportant, so long as what the real estate developer
proposes is within the law, or an interpretation of the law that a lawyer can
convince a court to adopt. Our moral choices are often made in more richly
textured context than the stark portrayal of the problem presented here, but
there is reason to believe we are sometimes asked to act and exercise judgement

on the barest of facts. Basically, we want to know what the real estate developer
is going to do with the property. Is he going to build low-income housing? Is it
possible that the historical homes cannot be economically rehabilitated? We
want to know more about the developer. What kind of projects has he been
associated with in the past? What kind of reputation does he have? Others,
imbued with the spirit of legalism and the interpretative crafts of lawyering will
inquire into the language of the badly drafted statute. Some will want to know
whether the lawyer asked to take the case is a "starving" young lawyer or an
established pillar of the community.
(continued)
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a lawyer represent the developer and claim to be acting in the moral
tradition of Atticus Finch?19
We can, knowing the contextual, particularized, situational nature of moral
decisionmaking, fantasize the possibility that once we know all the facts we will
know what it is right to do. The other possibility is that for every fact that might
"tilt" the decision one way, the next fact we learn has the potential to move the
decision in the opposite direction. At some point, we may conclude that it is not
the "facts" but our character that will ultimately determine what we will do.
19. If the politics of this ethical question bothers you (and there are politics
in every ethical question) consider other cases in which politics cut in another
direction: Should an American lawyer have represented the Nicaraguan
government in an action against the United States before the International
World Court and claim to be acting in the moral tradition of Atticus Finch when
our government was financing an armed rebellion against the Nicaraguan
Sandinista government? Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, in an opinion piece in the
Washington Post, implied that Abram Chayes, the American lawyer who
represented Nicaragua, was cooperating with a foreign government to
undermine United States policy and that it was wrong for him to use his
advocacy skills on behalf of Nicaragua. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Nicaragua'sU.S.
Lawyers, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1985, at A15. Kirkpatrick's concern was voiced
when Nicaragua was in the hands of the Sandinista government, a government
so vehemently opposed by the Reagan administration that Lt. Col. Oliver North
was allowed to use the National Security Council as a front for the illegal
diversion of funds to Contras fighting the Sandinista.
Abram Chayes, in his response, noted that Kirkpatrick's concern about
United States foreign policy ignores the "bedrock proposition" that even our
government is "subject to and accountable before the law." Abram Chayes,
What Kirkpatrick Ignores, WASH. POSr, Oct.4, 1985, at A23.

One issue between Kirkpatrick and Chayes was whether the representation
of Nicaragua before the World Court was a political or legal matter. The issue
could be refrained as a moral one. Chayes may have taken on the
representation of Nicaragua because he found United States foreign policy, not
only illegitimate and a violation of international law, but immoral as well. Roger
Wilkins, a Washington, D.C. lawyer commenting on Kirkpatrick's blast at
Chayes, pointed out that
[tlhe attempt by one sovereign state [the United States] to instigate the
overthrow of another [Nicaragua] by means, among others, of murder,
rape and theft would seem to me to present quintessential questions of
international law, even though the decision to follow such a course may
have been a political one. It is clear that illegal acts may flow from
political decisions.
Roger Wilkins, Letter to the editor, WASH. POST,Oct. 6, 1985, at D6.
Lloyd N. Cutler, one of the most widely known lawyers in Washington,
argued that so long as Mr. Chayes "believes there are reasonable jurisdictional
and substantive arguments to be made in Nicaragua's behalf, he has every
(continued)
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Some students and commentators on legal ethics claim the
answer is yes. Confusion develops because the real estate developer's
proposal, with the help of an astute lawyer, may turn out to be legal. If
you want to be a lawyer, and you do not want to be confronted with
concerns about the ethics of zealousness, then you can assume that
lawyers have a well-compensated, at times unpleasant, job of doing
what clients want done.2 ° Consider the propositions implied in such
an assumption: (1) lawyering is a job (in contrast to the inflated selfpromoting rhetoric that accompanies professional insiders); (2) the
propriety of what the client wants is measured by whether it is legally
permitted in contrast to what is morally accountable; and, (3) lawyers
ethical right to present its case to the court." Lloyd N. Cutler, Letter to the editor,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 6, 1985, at D6.
Another commentator observed that "what Mrs. Kirkpatrick should
remember is that patriotism sometimes requires taking a hard look at our own
actions, in the tradition of a John Adams." Pierre M. Hartman, Letter to the
editor, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1985, at A26.
George C. Smith, associate general counsel to the conservative Washington
Legal Foundation, argued that the problem was not that Nicaragua had a
United States lawyer, but that Chayes had been legal advisor to the State
Department during the Kennedy administration and in that capacity was privy
to sensitive and confidential information. Smith charged Chayes with a
violation of confidence gained as a government lawyer. Smith contends that the
Washington legal establishment, including Lloyd Cutler, does not condemn
Chayes' movement through the "revolving door" (representing first the
government and then using the knowledge gained in government service to
represent non-government interest) because the "American bar establishment is
so completely dominated by a combination of mercenary and liberalinternationalist mentalities" that no one sees the harm in Chayes "peculiar
version of the 'revolving door."' George C. Smith, Nicaragua's Lawyer is Not
Just Any Lawyer, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1985, at A19.
On October 7, 1985, the Reagan administration, fearful of an adverse
decision by the International Court of Justice on claims by Nicaragua that the
United States had violated international law, ended a thirty-nine year policy
under which the United States had agreed to abide by the International Court's
decisions. John M. Goshko, U.S. Limits Recognition of World Court Rulings,

WASH. POST, October 8, 1985 at Al. For a defense of the United States decision,
see Editorial, Opting Out of the Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct 11,
1985, at A2.
20. This view supports what Richard Wasserstrom once described as a
profession induced simplified amoral universe. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers
as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1 (1975).

It is, in this

simplified world, morally acceptable to represent the real estate developer so
long as what he seeks to do is legal. Lawyers do not confront a moral problem
so long as they represent clients who act within the law. The problem, from the
amoralist view, turns out not to be a problem at all.
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can take any client that walks through the door without moral qualms
(because this is what lawyers do and rightfully do without fear of
moral condemnation because the work of lawyering can be
compartmentalized so the morals of the client do not taint the morals
of the lawyer).
When we try to unpack these operative assumptions of
conventional lawyer ethics (rigidified into unexamined
conventions) and consider how they find their way into our character
as lawyers, we encounter resistance. There is resistance to the
suggestion that a lawyer who sets out to represent the real estate
developer may have a moral dilemma. There is resistance on the
practical grounds that lawyers in the "Real World" do not pick and
choose their clients and cannot be expected to morally influence the
ends that their clients seek. This appeal to Real World necessity
contains just enough truth to make it appealing.2 1 This assertion
about the Real World distorts reality because lawyers, for practical,
financial, and ethical reasons, do not represent every potential client
who seeks their services. For example, lawyers refuse clients they do
not feel competent to represent, or clients that require attention that
would significantly detract from the representation of valued clients.
Many lawyers learn not to take clients they do not trust. Some
established lawyers do not take clients they actively dislike.2 2
21. Legal ethics, we are warned, "cannot be effective if addressed to a
world of ideals and angels. It must address our very real world of imperfect
justice, hard-headed and hard working attorneys, and difficult moral choices."
Edward J. Eberle, Toward Moral Responsibility in Lawyering: Further
Thoughts on the DeontologicalModel of Legal Ethics, 64 St. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 5
(1989). The problem, however, is that some conventional Real World claims
about lawyer ethics turn out to be rather appalling.
22. The traditional rhetoric of professional ethics would have us keep our
distance from the client while at the same time giving them "zealous"
representation. The model is objectivity and detachment, the lawyer works from
arms-length distance, "Free of compromising influences and loyalties." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-1 (1983). The folklore

surrounding this ideal of professional relations is that lawyers who get too close
to theit clients, get too involved, or overly identify, misserve their clients and
make trouble for themselves. For example, Seymour Wishman, in Confessions
of a Criminal Lawyer, relates how other lawyers had cautioned him "about
getting too close" to clients, suggesting that it interfered with good judgment.
SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OFACRIMINAL LAWYER 117 (1981).
Yet, even the ethical rules of the profession recognize that "liking" and
"disliking" the client cannot be dismissed so readily. One Ethical Consideration
of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility makes clear that lawyers should not
decline to represent clients solely on the basis of their being disliked in the
community. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-27
(continued)
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(1983). Also, we are not to decline representation simply because we, as lawyers,
will be disliked as a result of the representation. See EC 2-28. Liking and
disliking the client is a reality that the Code of Professional Responsibility is
forced to confront. Ethical Consideration 2-30 warns that "a lawyer should
decline employment, if the intensity of his [her] personal feeling, as
distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective
representation of a prospective client." But we are not required to like our clients
and are given every encouragement by traditional ethical standards to avoid the
kind of involvement that might be called friendship. The negative proposition,
the only one affirmatively stated in the Code, is that when we find we so
thoroughly dislike a person that our feelings would interfere with our lawyering
then representation should be declined. This formal ethical consideration is a far
Pry from the reality of the statement made to Seymour Wishman by Vinnie, a
homicide detective, who also happened to be his friend: "A likable client should
be considered an unnecessary luxury in this business." WISHMAN, supra at 115.
There are a number of reasons why Wishman found it possible to like his
clients. First, he realized that he identified with the criminals he represented.
Some clients "had their own sense of integrity and decency, although of a
different kind from that shared by most law-abiding members of society." Id. at
90. Criminals symbolize opposition to authority and Wishman identifies with
this opposition. Id. at 17,99. Later Wishman reveals that he found it "thrilling" to
learn about the lives of his clients and their crimes. Id. at 32. It is through his
clients that Wishman "become[s] familiar with a world that would otherwise
have remained hidden from me-a fascinating world, an intriguing, inviting,
seductive demiworld." Id. at 99.
With little prompting, my clients would describe their lives in lurid
detail-passionate, desperate lives filled with violence, drugs, and sex. I
must confess I sometimes felt a vicarious excitement on hearing the
exploits of these people so unfettered by the normal restraints. They
were living and running on the razor's edge.
Id. at 100. "I wasn't the only one," Wishman says, who was "titillated by the
stories. Judges, prosecutors, detectives, jurors-virtually all those connected with
the administration of criminal justice-experienced at one time or another this
sense of voyeurism." Id. But at other times Wishman realizes that he is not sure
what his motivations for working with these clients really are. Id. at 45.
But there are other reasons, more social and less psychoanalytic, to explain
Wishman's identification with his clients. His clients were black, Hispanic, and
poor. Id. at 90, 117. They were uneducated and schooled in violence. They
came "from families in which violence was as much a part of the household as a
screaming younger brother or sister." Id. at 117. Wishman was born in South
Bronx and grew up in Newark. Id. at 56. He knew something about the world
of his clients firsthand. "My father," Wishman says, "worked as a meatcutter for
thirty-seven years in this factory-sixty tedious and exhausting hours a week for
modest wages .. " Id. at 51.
(continued)
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The notion that it is a lawyer's job to represent clients and make
no moral judgment on what the client wants to do (ignoring
consequences, social harm, and personal repugnance) is a popular
moral view in legal education and professional circles. 2 3 The idea
that it is a lawyer's job to represent all clients, regardless of the
nature (moral, political, social, or psychological) of the claim or
cause, is elevated into a moral stance.2 4 It becomes a matter of

professional pride (in some circles) that lawyers can represent any
client, anywhere, anytime, with whatever legally sanctioned illconsequences might follow, and willfully ignore public complaints
about the "dirty work" we do for clients and the havoc we wreak in our
communities. This claim, that lawyers must always represent all
clients without regard to their morals, causes, or effects, is presented
to us as a matter of necessity writ large-Necessity. If it is the
lawyer's job to do nasty work, then we should get on with the task at
hand. Necessity brooks no argument.2 5

[Slome criminal lawyers had grown up on the street, living and playing
with many of the people we were later to become their clients. Their
attitudes toward lives and property were little different from those of
their clients. They even dressed and talked like their clients. Somewhere
along the line they had managed to get an education and membership
to the bar; now they represented the people they knew and understood
well.
Id. at 99.
23. The notion may be popular but it remains, as a moral matter, "simpleminded." See, e.g., Huff, supra note 9, at 53. "[flou should be warned against
the simple-minded identification of moral responsibility with role responsibility."
One reason we can talk about our "jobs"as lawyers in the way we do is because
"traditions of the profession do provide rationalizations for those who would
abandon their own judgment" to that of the firm or some imagined profession.
Edwin H. Greenebaum, Attorney's Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52
IND. L.J. 627, 630 (1977). Greenebaum goes on to point out that "[w]hatever
rationalizations lawyers accept . . . there will remain that portion of their

personalities which holds to notions of goodness which were learned as children
growing up in a family and in the general community." Id. If Greenebaum is
right and I assume he is, then the claim "I was only doing my job" must mean
that doing my job affirms that portion of personality that tells me what is good.
24. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., My Station as a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (1989).

25. There is a tendency on the part of many lawyers and students of law to
barricade themselves against moral concerns in a psychic fortress they call
Necessity. Some cling to unreflective ideas about the adversarial ethic even
more tenaciously after seeing how the stance misrepresents what lawyers
(continued)

1992]

THE MORAL LABYRINTH

If we are not careful we can let conventional notions about
lawyers, their job, and Necessity, make us think we are being
realistic2 6 when we are actually embedded in unexamined
conventions that are morally questionable.2 7 When we confront the
moral choices made in the name of Necessity, we learn that some
lawyers do not experience Necessity as a moral justification for what
they do. Juxtaposed to the reality of a hardball adversarial ethic is the
reality of lawyers who resist the troubled practices of ajob that leads to
moral malaise-and ultimately, a morally compromised life. There
is no Necessity that demands that we give up character to be lawyers.
The appeal to Necessity is simply a rhetoric move that justifies a
sense of self, profession, and world that cannot admit that we profit by
the convenience, self-interest, and failures of imagination and
character that accompany an unreflective adversarial ethic. It is the
rhetoric of lawyer job talk and the appeal to Necessity that drives the
zealousness ethic to extremes. It is we, not the job, who transform
zealousness into zealotry. We become zealots, the same way Atticus
became a lawyer hero, without thinking about it, by participating in
an ethos that constitutes a closed loop that wards off the complications
of criticism and contrasting ethical possibilities.
It is a simple matter to claim, but more difficult to demonstrate,
how an activated sense of ordinary morality and the ethical
sensibilities we bring with us to law can be used to curb our zeal for
adversarialism. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that one
sense of ordinary morality (the habit of zealousness) is set against
actually do in the world of practice. Ironically, law students who proclaim the
demands of Necessity know little about any real, or for that matter, fictional
lawyers, apart from the lawyers they see represented on television. Talk about
the Real World is often an uninformed, decidedly partial, portrayal of reality.
26. An appeal to the real world 'logic" of an adversarial ethic bounded only
by legal constraints carries the name of realism but is actually a kind of romantic
individualism that takes solace in the image of the tough "kick ass" lawyer who
can not only look after himself but anyone else who can pay the price.
27. Do we really want to be what we turn out to be when our moral
imaginations are captured by prosaic conventions of legal practice? Some of us,
apparently, do. One can imagine a young woman or young man saying,
I have come a long way to get here, to what I assumed would be an
exalted position. I want to be a lawyer not a social worker. I did not
come to law to labor under the double burden of being a skilled, tough,
winning lawyer, and be held to task for the morals of the clients I serve.
No lawyer should be held to such an ethical burden. There is no reason
to believe that lawyers have, or should be expected to have, more
character than anyone else in our society.
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another sense of ordinary morality (the knowledge that zealousness
has its limits). The desire to take zealousness to the limits is a feature
of everyday life, but no more so than the ordinary moral notion that
zealousness has its limits. It is our inquiry into lawyer ethics that
puts us to work re-imagining the images of an adversarial ethic that
transforms zealousness into zealotry.
III.
A well-established Washington, D.C. law firm, Covington &
Burling, represents South African Airways and must decide whether
it will continue its representation.2" South African Airways is a
government-owned, money-making subsidiary of the South African
government, a government that maintains, by law (now being
dismantled), a brutal, repressive regime of racial segregation called
apartheid.
When students of law consider the Covington & Burling decision,
some argue that representing South African Airways is no more an
ethical problem than representing the real estate developer who seeks
to destroy historical homes. There are, in the world of high-priced
legal talent (and in the world of those who seek admission to this
world), arguments for the continued representation of South African
Airways.29 In the world of law there are, we are not surprised to find,
those who will argue both sides of this issue.
28. I learned of this ethical problem from a news account. David E. Sanger,
Law Firm Drops South Africa Client, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1985, at D1. Mark
Green reported on the problem some ten years before the decision of Covington
& Burling to terminate its representation. See MARK GREEN, THE OTHER
GOVERNMENT: THE UNSEEN POWERS OF WASHINGTON LAWYERS 196-99 (1975).
News accounts of Covington & Burling's decision resulted in a spate of
opinion editorials and letters to the editor in the New York Times and the
Washington Post. See Ronald L. Goldfarb, Lawyers-or Hired Guns?, WASH.
POST,Oct. 17, 1985, at A23; When a Law Firm Feels Obliged to 'Fire'aClient, N.
Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1985, at 20E; Lawyers-or Hired Guns? WASH. POST, Letter to
the Editor Oct. 24, 1985, at A22.
For other commentary on the firm's decision, see Mark Shuford, Elkins
Speaks on Firm'sSouth Africa Decision, WASH. & LEE NEWS, Dec. 5, 1985, at 7;
Steve Nelson, Covington's Decision May Spur Pressure on South Africa Issue, 8
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 1; Boycott Leaders Buoyed by D.C. Firm's
Decision, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 6.
29. Consider for example, Judge Irving Kaufman's observation about the
"costs" in refusing to continue to represent a client willing to pursue immoral
practices: "[T]he lawyer will then be unable to influence the client's conduct
favorably." Irving R. Kaufman, Law: "No Longer Can the Lawyer Avoid
(continued)
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How can we do what we do or know what to do (what is best; what is
good) when we hear arguments so readily advanced to justify the
extremes of adversarialism? How is a law firm to decide what to do
about its representation of an agency of a foreign government that
supports by law a reprehensible social policy like apartheid?"
The lawyers of Covington & Burling will, at some point in their
deliberations, turn to the Rules of ProfessionalConduct (or the Code of
Professional Responsibility) to determine whether there are "ethical
rules" that might guide (or dictate) the decision to withdraw from
representation of South African Airways. The firm will find, when it
turns to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.16, which speaks
directly to the decision of a lawyer (or law firm) to withdraw from
representation. But the rule says only that it will not be an ethical
violation for the firm to withdraw if they have "good cause" to do so.
One "good cause" reason for withdrawal recognized by Rule 1.16 is
the firm's belief that the objectives of the client are "repugnant". The
rule leaves to the discretion of the lawyer whether to act when a "good
cause" is present. The rule does not solve the practical problem or the
ethical problem (if the two could ever be more than provisionally
separated) because the rule does not say what an ethical lawyer will do
in these situations; the rule does not command a particular outcome.3 1
Consider for a moment the possibility that the lawyers at
Covington and Burling, trying to decide what to do about their
continued representation of South African Airways, do not adequately
understand apartheid. Is it possible that lawyers who inform
themselves about the actual workings of apartheid will find it a
modern day manifestation of evil sufficient to subdue their
arguments for continued representation of South African Airways?
Lawyers do not come easily to the notion that they actively participate
Impropriety by Adherence to Principles of Fairness in the Conduct of
Litigation,"SATURDAY REV., Nov. 1, 1975, at 15; ROBERT ARONSON & DONALD
WEICKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 11 (1980) ("A lawyer who

represents a developer may be in a very good position to influence the client's
actions so that they make environmental as well as business sense." There are,
of course, costs for the lawyer who remains with the client solely to insure that
the client will do more good than he or she would do in the absence of the
lawyer. An element of this cost will be moral in nature.).
30. One wonders where Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who hinted at treason in
Abraham Chayes' representation of Nicaragua, would come out on Covington
and Burling's decision to withdraw its representation of South African Airways.
See supra note 19.
31. Huff, supra note 9, at 52 ("[Clodes do not offer a developed account of
how you are to express your own more general moral principles in meeting
your professional responsibilities.").
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in the continued existence of injustice. The image of lawyers
engaged in advocacy divorced from the moral quality of the client's
cause or case assumes a freedom that promotes justice. This
assumption is not dislodged even when an evil like apartheid lurks
in our midst. The disposition to ignore the consequences of the legal
representation of South African Airways is not overcome, at least by
some lawyers and students of law, even when they are confronted
with a panoply of facts about overcoming apartheid, the role that South
African Airways plays in government apartheid policies, and that
withdrawal from representation might actually be an "effective" way
to bring change to South Africa, and even if it is not effective in the
most immediate sense it may be a worthwhile symbolical protest of
apartheid. Adversarialsim, seems to linger in our heads and
ultimately in our hearts, whatever the facts may turn out to be.
When we come this far in the ethics conversation we look at each
other, quizzically, and with a small measure of loathing. Who are
we? What have we become? What do we stand for as lawyers? What
do we stand against? Are there limits-call them ethical, call them by
another name-on what lawyers will do in the name of an
adversarial ethic? Is it too much to expect lawyers and law firms like
Covington & Burling to take a stance against something as insidious
as apartheid? Is it possible that to continue representation of a client
like South African Airways means that we are more interested in
money than in upholding the principal of client autonomy? These
questions about the adversarial ethic suggest that we must enter the
lawyer's heart of darkness before we will know what it means to be a
good lawyer. 2
If you assume Covington & Burling does not confront a moral
problem in its continued representation of South African Airways
then you will be prepared for yet another argument: "I would argue
for the firm to continue representation of South African Airways
because if the firm withdraws someone else will represent them. This
means that we will accomplish nothing by withdrawing our
representation because South African Airways will simply find a
new firm to represent it. If we do not do it, someone else will." Before
we see how loose and morally troubling this argument is, we must
hear it argued and supported. Whatever our concerns about South
Africa's people of color, there is a voice that reassures us that
32. The paradox of ethics is that for each philosophical argument, political
theory, sociological description of the real world, and ethical rule there is a
contrary (or complementary) philosophy, theory, description, or rule that pulls
in another direction. There is, at the heart of our moral stances, a series of
contradictions that can be resolved only by a leap of faith.
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"everyone has a right to a lawyer, even the government of South
Africa." It sounds right, we have heard it before, and we know that
this argument stands, in some convoluted way, for something
worthwhile in our profession. We have heard the argument often
enough to convince ourselves it must be a good argument. It is an
argument that says something about the "system", expresses an ideal,
and one version of a conventional understanding of the lawyer role.
Adversarialists argue that lawyers cannot and should not be saddled
with their clients' social, political, and moral views. It would be a
saving grace if argument could make it so, make it stick, and give it
moral weight. These claims of adversarialists are just true enough to
make them viable. They also reflect how difficult it is to sort-out the
ideal of zealousness from the self-interest and the arrogance of willed
self-deception about how the adversarial system works. 33 It points to
our inability to distinguish between ethics and the excuses we
rehearse in the name of ethics.
In our talk of what we would do and would not do, what we should
do, and what Necessity (as a law firm partner) demands of us, one
begins to get the sense that something has gone wrong. 34 As we talk
33. Some students of legal ethics argue that if Covington & Burling does
not continue its representation of South African Airways the "system of justice"
will be adversely affected. Here we get the stock Law Day speech about the
virtues of the adversary system of justice: even with all its faults no one has
found a better system. But how strange it is to make use of the word "justice"
when it is apartheid that is central to the "system" of South African politics and
jurisprudence. To make these arguments and this kind of talk about lawyer
ethics work, we must deny that it is we (the lawyers) who work the "system"
and make the "system" work the way it does. When we talk so aggressively
about representing a client like South African Airways (and indirectly the South
African government) to preserve a "system of justice" we are confronted with
the kind of loose talk thatmakes lawyers the victim of their own rhetoric.
34. One thing that has gone wrong is that we focus on the moral and
ethical problem that confronts the lawyers at Covington & Burling and get the
cart before the horse. Instead of being preoccupied with moral decisions
appropriate we may do better to shift our attention from the moral dilemmas
themselves to the people acting in them.
William May explores the mistake we make when moral problems rather
than character become our primary focus:
Moralists make a mistake when they concentrate solely on the
quandaries that practitioners face, or on the defects of the structures in
which they operate. Inquiry into these matters already assumes specific
dispositions of character, which themselves need to be clarified and
criticized. The quandary-oriented professional tends to assume and
prize the virtue of conscientiousness. The critic of structures often
(continued)
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ethics we bring ourselves and others to doubt the moral sensibilities
we most desperately need.
In fact, there seems to be something seriously wrong.3 5 If you
know anything about apartheid, 6 know anything about how apartheid
is practiced, you will be troubled by the fact that many lawyers are not
only willing to represent the South African government and its
money-making subsidiaries but, more troubling, cannot see that it is
a reflection on their ethics when they choose to do so. 7 Lawyers do
brings to the inquiry a specifically aroused moral indignation.
Important to professional ethics is the moral disposition the
professional brings to the structure in which he operates, and that
shapes his or her approach to problems. The practitioner's perception
of role, character, virtues and style can affect the problems he sees, the
level at which he tackles them, the personal presence and bearing he
brings to them, and the resources with which he survives moral crises
to function another day. At the same time, his moral commitments, or
lack of them, the general ethos in which he and his colleagues function,
can frustrate the most well-intentioned structural reforms.
William May, Professional Ethics: Setting, Terrain & Teacher, in ETHICS
TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 205, 230 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok, eds.,
1980). For one account of the human loss for the kind of lawyering done at
Covington & Burling, see CHARLES REICH, THE SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 1983 (1976).
35. Walker Percy, one of our more engaging philosophical novelists
observed, "I am perfectly willing to believe Flannery O'Conner when she said,
and she wasn't kidding, that the modem world is a territory largely occupied by
the devil. No one doubts the malevolence abroad in the world." WALKER PERCY,
SIGN-POSTS IN A STRANGE LAND 380 (1991). Percy was less interested in the
malevolence of the world and more in what he calls 'looniness". "The looniness,
that is to say, of the 'normal' denizen of the Western world who, I think it is fair
to say, doesn't know who he is, what he believes, or what he is doing." Id. at 38081.
36. See, e.g., Courtland Milloy, Opening Eyes, WASH. PosT, Nov. 26, 1985, at
C3; Christopher S. Wren, Apartheid Frays at the Edges, But Its Core is
Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1989, at E2; Anthony Lewis, Luxury of
Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1989, at E23; Christopher S. Wren, Mandela,
Freed, Urges Rise in Pressureon White Rule, N.Y. TIMES, February 12, 1990, at
1; David B. Ottaway, Afrikaners Feel Betrayed by de Kelerk: Descendants of
Dutch Settlers Believe God OrdainedThem to Form White Nation, WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 1990, at A26.
37. Defenders of the lawyer as amoral technician are not going to concede
(and some will never see) the moral limits of their stance. There are many
reasons, psychological and sociological in nature, that "program" our inability to
"see" the limits of our moral stances. On the prerationalist, rationalist,
modernist, and post-modernist cognitive stances that find their way into our
(continued)
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what they do for money (South African Airways pays its bills so the
lawyers can pay theirs), for status, for promotion in the firm, and to
complicate matters, they do it in the language of principles, craft, 8
and ethics.3 9
IV.
We learn our ethics as lawyers, we are not born with them. One
source of learning, about lawyers and the world, is stories.4 ° The
stories that provide powerful moral lessons are sometimes about
lawyers and sometimes about others who provoke our moral
imaginations.
For example, Bowen McCoy, an American
businessman, tells a story about his efforts to scale an 18,000-foot peak
in the Himalayas.4
McCoy is a Wall Street realty executive, not a
lawyer, but when he talks about ethics he talks a language lawyers
can understand.4 2
In The Parable of the Sadhu, McCoy describes efforts of he and
his companion, Stephen, an anthropologist, accompanied by a group of
climbers, to traverse an 18,000-foot peak in order to reach the village
of Muklinath, an ancient holy place. The peak was the highest
mountain pass they had attempted in a sixty-day Nepal hike. Six
world views, see Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces:A Cognitive Approach to Law,
67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989).

38. There are craft skills involved in finding a legal way to do what the
most devious and immoral client wants done. First, there are, if the old adage
holds, always arguments to be made on both sides of an issue. Second, weak
arguments need strong advocates. Third, the government does get sloppy in its
heavy-handed ways, and it is possible to identify with the client, even the client
with the immoral cause, made a victim of a "system" that makes individual
immorality 100 percent small by comparison.
39. Rule 1.2(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A lawyer's
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
40. One of the most eloquent defenders of this proposition is Thomas
Shaffer. See, e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 12 (arguing that our morals begin in
stories and~that our search for a way out of our moral malaise as lawyers will
take us back to stories).
41. Bowen H. McCoy, The Parableof the Sadhu, 61 HARV. Bus. REv. 103
(1983).
42. I have often wondered whether as students of lawyer ethics we might
not be better advised to study the ethics of those outside the legal profession as
well as the moral practices of lawyers. If ordinary morality is going to have any
bite in this mythical real world we are all trying to live in (and live against) and
in our lives as lawyers, then we are going to need ideas about ethics from
whatever source we can tap.
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years earlier McCoy had attempted a similar climb and had been
forced back by altitude sickness. The weather, on the day of the
attempted traverse, was unfavorable and McCoy feared that they
would not be able to make it over the pass.
At 15,500 feet, it looked to me as if Stephen [who had
accompanied McCoy on the trip and the climb] was shuffling
and staggering a bit, which are symptoms of altitude
sickness ....

I felt strong, my adrenaline was flowing, but I

was very concerned about my ultimate ability to get across. A
couple of our porters were suffering from the height, and
Pasang, our Sherpa sirdar (leader), was worried.
Just after daybreak, while we rested at 15,500 feet, one of
the New Zealanders, who had gone ahead, came staggering
down toward us with a body slung across his shoulders. He
dumped the almost naked, barefoot body of an Indian holy
man-a sadhu-at my feet. He had found the pilgrim lying
on the ice, shivering -and suffering from hypothermia. I
cradled the sadhu's head and laid him on the rocks. The New
Zealander was angry. He wanted to get across the pass before
the bright sun melted the snow. He said, "Look, I've done
what I can. You have porters and sherpa guides. You care for
him. We're going on!" He turned and went back up the
mountain to join his friends.
I took a carotid pulse and found that the sadhu was still
alive. We figured he had probably visited the holy shrines at
Muklinath and was on his way home. It was fruitless to
question why he had chosen this desperately high route instead
of the safe, heavily traveled caravan route through the Kali
Gandaki gorge. Or why he was almost naked and with no
shoes, or how long he had been lying in the pass. The answers
were not going to solve our problem.
Stephen and the four Swiss began stripping off outer
clothing and opening their packs. The sadhu was soon clothed
from head to foot. He was not able to walk, but he was very
much alive. I looked down the mountain- and spotted below the
Japanese climbers marching up with a horse.
Without a great deal of thought, I told Stephen and Pasang
that I was concerned about withstanding the heights to come
and wanted to get over the pass. I took off after several of our
porters who had gone ahead.
On the steep part of the ascent where, if the ice steps had
given way, I would have slid down about 3000 feet, I felt
vertigo. I stopped for a breather, allowing the Swiss to catch up
with me. I inquired about the sadhu and Stephen. They said
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that the sadhu was fine and that Stephen was just behind. I set
off again for the summit.
Stephen arrived at the summit an hour after I did. Still
exhilarated by victory, I ran down the snow slope to
congratulate him. He was suffering from altitude sickness,
walking 15 steps, then stopping, walking 15 steps, then
stopping. Pasang accompanied him all the way up. When I
reached them, Stephen glared at me and said: "How do you
feel about contributing to the death of a fellow man?"
I did not fully comprehend what he meant. "Is the sadhu
dead?" I inquired.
"No," replied Stephen, "but he surely will be!" After I had
gone, and the Swiss had departed not long after, Stephen had
remained with the sadhu. When the Japanese had arrived,
Stephen had asked to use their horse to transport the sadhu
down to the hut. They had refused. He had then asked Pasang
to have a group of our porters carry the sadhu. Pasang had
resisted the idea, saying that the porters would have to exert all
their energy to get themselves over the pass. He had thought
they could not carry a man down 1000 feet to the hut, reclimb
the slope, and get across safely before the snow melted.
Pasang had pressed Stephen not to delay any longer. The
Sherpas had carried the sadhu down to a rock in the sun at
about 15,000 feet and had pointed out the hut another 500 feet
below. The Japanese had given him food and drink. When
they had last seen him he was listlessly throwing rocks at the
Japanese party's dog, which had frightened him.
We do not know if the sadhu lived or died.43
The encounter with the sadhu produced, what McCoy calls, a
classic moral dilemma. McCoy, deeply troubled by his decision to
leave the sadhu behind after providing minimal care, concludes that
the mountain ascent was not as important as he assumed while he was
on the mountain. He puzzles over his failure to provide more care for
the sadhu, a puzzlement he refers to as a parable. 44 McCoy tries, along
43. McCoy, supra note 41, at 104.
44. McCoy calls his story a parable. McCoy, supra note 41, at 103. Parables
have often been used by powerful teachers. Robert Burt observes that,
parables are not intended to be readily accessible to any listener. They
are designed to raise questions more than to answer them, to confound
rather than to confirm prior understanding, and particularly to
accomplish this in order to raise doubts among their listeners about
(continued)
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whether they are among the elect or remain outside among those who
"hear and hear, but understand nothing."
Robert Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455,
469 (1984).
Burt uses the stories that Jesus tells in the Biblical Gospels as examples of
teaching parables. Consider for example the parable of the prodigal son,
A father divides his wealth between his two sons; the younger son takes
his share away from the family home and squanders it, then returns
impoverished and feeling disgraced. But the father welcomes him
joyously, arranges a homecoming feast and proclaims to everyone,
"[L]et us eat and make merry; for this my son was dead, and is alive
again; he was lost, and is found."
Now [the] elder son was in the field; and as he came and drew near to
the house, he heard music and dancing. And he called one of the
servants and asked what this meant. And [the servant] said to him
"Your brother has come, and your father has killed the fatted calf,
because he has received him safe and sound." But [the elder son] was
angry and refused to go in. His father came out and entreated him, but
he answered his father, "Lo, these many years I have served you, and I
never disobeyed your command; yet you never gave me a kid, that I
might make merry with my friends. But when this son of yours came,
who has devoured your living with harlots, you killed for him the fatted
calf?" And [his father] said to him, "Son, you are always with me, and all
that is mine is yours. Its fitting to make merry and be glad, for this your
brother was dead, and is alive; he was lost and is found."
Id. at 467-68 (citing Luke 15:23-24, 25-32 (Revised Standard)).
The open texture and unresolved questions are, explains Burt, crucial to the
parable genre.
[W]e are not told whether the elder brother was persuaded by his
father's injunction to join in the rejoicing .... Why should the elder

brother rejoice? Is it because the father has ordered him to rejoice, has
invoked his superior authority? And is the further implicit message that
Jesus in telling the parable has invoked his extraordinary authority, his
divine authority, to establish the correctness of the father's command
that we should all rejoice.
Id. at 468. Burt concludes that the parable "[hiolds open the possibility for
continued dispute between Jesus and his listeners as well as between the father
and his elder son." Id.
The parable means one thing to an insider, another to an outsider. Or as we
might say, there are different ways to interpret the meaning of the parable,
(continued)
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with the reader, to figure out what the message of the parable is and
how it can be understood and how it can be given practical meaning.

different lessons that might be learned from it. Or, we might say the parable
means something different to everyone who reads it. Or, we might say that
there is no authoritative reading of a story such as this.
Why would one use parables, stories that obscure their meaning, when they
are being told to convey meaning? Burt points out that when asked by his own
disciplines about the use of parables in teaching, Jesus replied,
To you the secret of the kingdom of God has been given; but to those
who are outside everything comes by way of parables, so that (as
Scripture says) they may look and look, but see nothing; they may hear
and hear, but understand nothing; otherwise they might turn to God
and be forgiven.
Id. at 468-69 (citing Mark 4:11-12 (New English)).
To those outside the learning and teaching, the parable is obscure, a
mystery. For those inside the meaning is clear, it is "given". It is only for
outsiders that explanation is necessary. Id. at 469. But even for the insider the
story can be confounding. One purpose of the prodigal son parable is "to unsettle
those who are confident of their rectitude." Id. "The strategy in all this is not
simply to confound or to raise self-doubts for their own sake; the strategy is to
heighten the listeners' sense of their own vulnerability." Id. "[N]o one can take
for granted that he is safely in some protected flock, that he is found." Id. at 471.
The underlying goal-and the basic methodology of... parables-is
to lead the listeners to acknowledge a question, not an answer: a
question about the true extent of their own safety. The premise of this
methodology is that when the listeners acknowledge their vulnerability,
they will see the appeal of the answer that Christ represents. The [New
Gospel] parables in effect only teach the proper question so that, once
taught this, the true initiates teach themselves the proper answer.

What is the lesson in all of this for judicial conduct in our secular
society? Again, the first part of the lesson is methodological. Judicial
invocation of the Constitution recurrently uses the same methods as
these parables: converting all into needy outsiders by confounding
insider and outsider and then offering hope for ultimate protection by
mapping a path back inside for everyone.
Id at 471.
On the pedagogy of parables, see John J. Bonsignore, In Parables:Teaching
Through Parables,12 LEG. STUD. F. 191 (1988).
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McCoy's parable teaches, not only because it offers what McCoy
calls a classic moral dilemma, but is told as a compelling story.
McCoy offers, in his reflections on the dilemma, some instructive
clues about how ethics work and how ethics fail. It is a story that
illustrates how our purposes, morally neutral in one context-McCoy
did not set out on his journey to harm a holy pilgrim-blind us to the
needs of others, and paradoxically, to our own needs as well.
McCoy's parable raises the question of whether we have a duty to
look after those who are in need that we encounter along the way.
Should I follow through on the long-standing goal of getting over the
mountain pass or give up the goal to help another human being? And
if we have some duty to care for others, how is it that we so easily walk
past them?4" Is the sadhu story a parable for lawyers?
. If we feel, as McCoy implies, that he had a duty to provide more
adequate care for the sadhu, then how can we excuse ourselves as
lawyers for not caring for the rights, concerns, and welfare of others
on the. expedient grounds that it is not our job (role) to do so? McCoy
confesses to worrying about the decision that he made to abandon the
sadhu, yet, when we talk through McCoy's story and his efforts to
"see" the nature of the encounter more clearly (now that he is off the
mountain), McCoy, the businessman, turns out to be more sensitive to
the situation than many law student readers of the parable.
McCoy fears that his ethics failed him up on the mountain in his
encounter with the sadhu. Even more puzzling (at least to McCoy) is
that his friend, Stephen, a "committed Quaker with deep moral
vision" who did comprehend the moral situation was equally

45. Huff, supra note 9, at 50.
Suppose a client arrives at your office seeking help to achieve ends
which are unjust or immoral.... A bitter husband seeks custody of his
children in a divorce battle simply to hurt his wife, or a debtor wants to
escape an honest debt by invoking a legal technicality against the
debtor. How should you respond? First it should be noted that you
must recognize that there is a moral conflict in the situation presented
by the client. This may not occur if you are sufficiently isolated from
moral claims outside your professional role. You, as a lawyer, are
particularly vulnerable to this way of missing moral issues because you
are constantly called upon in your professional life to act as the agent of
your clients--to speak or make arguments on their behalf whether you
agree with those arguments or not.
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unresponsive to the needs of the sadhu."6 It was, says McCoy,
Stephen's moral vision that helped him know, in ways that he did not,
that they had a duty to care for the sadhu, and that whatever reason
they might have for continuing the Nepal climb was morally
insufficient to abandon the sadhu.
McCoy suggests that it is the mistakes we make about purposes
and goals that block our moral vision. In previous trips to Nepal,
McCoy observes that his most interesting experiences were those in
which he "lived in a Sherpa home in the Khumbu for five days
recovering from altitude sickness" and that the high point of a
previous trip for Stephen had been "an invitation to participate in a
family funeral ceremony in Manang. Neither experience had
47
[anything] to do with climbing high passes of the Himalayas."
McCoy reflects on the nature of these unexpected experiences that were
not contemplated as part of his and Stephen's avowed reasons for
being in Nepal and asks why they were so adamant about getting over
the mountain when it was the experiences outside those they had
planned that had been most meaningful to them. A good question for
lawyers!
V.
Wayne Brazil, a law teacher at Hastings, provides another story
about how we fail to care for others. Brazil describes the incident this
way:
I was walking one morning from the commuter train
station to school. I encountered one of those dirty, hapless,
vaguely threatening people whose presence gives the
Tenderloin section of San Francisco its special charm. To
make my story easier to tell I'll call him Archie.
My first reaction to Archie was fear, but that's not
particularly remarkable, because my first reaction to almost
everything is fear. My second reaction was more noteworthy.
It was a crisp sense of indignation.
I was moralistic, condemning him (silently, of course) for
being in the state he was in, for not working, for not seizing
control over his life and earning the money to pay his own
way.
46. McCoy, supra note 41, at 104. Stephen argued that they had failed to
adequately care for the sadhu and attributed the failure to an unwillingness to
assume personal responsibility and the fact that the sadhu was so unlike
themselves in appearance. I. at 104-06.
47. Il at 108.
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Then, before these feelings had played themselves out, I
became self-conscious about the way I was reacting. I began to
think about the distance that seemed to separate me and
Archie. It occurred to me that I really had no understanding
at all of him or his situation. I had no idea what forces had
been at work in his life, what limitations God or history had
imposed on him. I had no idea whether he had the capacity to
be anything other than what he was-whether he had that
morning, or ever had, any meaningful control over his fate.
As I became more self-conscious about my ignorance I
also became more embarrassed by my initial moralistic and
condescending reaction.
I realized that my reaction had been born in the gulf that
separated me and Archie-and that that reaction was graphic
evidence about how wide that gulf had become.
I began to think about the many different ways the
distance between me and the Archies of the world has grown
in the last several years.
As I have worked hard to succeed and to contribute, I have
become more specialized, and more sophisticated in my
specialty. And I have spent almost all of my time with
comparably specialized and sophisticated people.
The hard work that has brought me material comfort and
professional achievement has made me tired, and tired of
being tired. So I have become much less patient with people
who do not seem to be trying as hard, or who appear to rely on
others to meet even their most basic needs.
In short, I have become preoccupied with my struggle to do
better and with what that struggle has cost me. And in the
preoccupation I have permitted self-serving, moralistic
assumptions to displace the more open-minded concern about
people like Archie that I once felt.
This train of thought led to the perception that troubled me
the most; just as the situational distance between me and
Archie has grown largest, my empathy-my impulse to try to
understand him-has been evaporating.
Pretty heavy stuff to be pondering on a summer morning.
There was one more thing. As an erstwhile historian it
occurred to me that I probably was not the only person who had
drifted in these emotional directions during the last decade. It
was the spectre of many people who occupy positions like mine
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moving in emotional directions like this that inspired [this
reflection on] ...deterioration in our sense of community.4"
Brazil explains his disdain for Archie, the street person he
encounters on his way to the law school where he teaches, by the fact
that he had become a success in his work and spent so much time with
other successful people like himself. His work and the success it
made possible brought Brazil "material comfort and professional
achievement" but it had also brought him weariness. Brazil
confesses to being "preoccupied" with his own struggle, a
preoccupation that resulted in "self-serving, moralistic
assumptions" about the homeless Archie. Like McCoy, Brazil's work
has sanctioned, if it has not prompted, an erosion of empathy, an
impoverishment of what Maxine Greene has called moral
imagination.4 9 Brazil suggests that his, and by implication McCoy's,
story reflect the "emotional direction" that we have been traveling
during the last decade. 0
48. Wayne Brazil, Reflections on Community, Responsibility, and Legal
Education, 9 J. LEGAL PROF. 93 (1984).

49. Greene's theory of "moral imagination", found throughout her
exemplary work, is explored in two essays, Maxine Greene The New Freedom
and the Moral Life and Wide-Awakeness and the Moral Life, in LANDSCAPES OF
LEARNING 147-57, 42-52 (1978).

50. Moral malaise, when we give it the attention it deserves, does indeed
have an "emotional direction". Whether law teachers, like Wayne Brazil and the
author of this essay, have any credibility as commentators on our moral drift
and as moral teachers, is an open question. One commentator notes that
[ilt has been enormously popular to say that there are no moral experts.
But this is said thoughtlessly. Even those who say it seek advice about
hard cases; and even they regard some people as typically foolish and
others as not foolish. These critics notice there are a few people who
have a certain knack for finding their way through very difficult moral
situations without doing the sorts of wrongs which the rest of us find so
easy to do. Indeed, the critics of the supposed established wisdoms are
themselves typically uttering the wisdom or findings of other persons,
whom they implicitly regard as their gurus. The reality is that each of
us has probably known at least one wise person-perhaps a parent,
relative, pastor, priest, rabbi, teacher, or neighbor. Such people strike us
as knowing what they are doing when the rest of us do not. They
impress us not simply as lucky, but as having unusual insight into
moral situations and unusual ability to put their insight into practice.
They are good people. They have something enviable. We might call it
judgment. Aristotle called it practical wisdom. And he thought this trait
so important that he mentioned it in his famous account of what virtue
(continued)
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There are many stories like McCoy's and Brazil's, stories about
the driving, zealous energy we bring to our pursuits, an energy, drive,
and purposefulness that can, barring caution and reflection, blind us
to the care we owe others. If we were more truthful about our own
stories than we tend to be-self-deception is a serious undertow in
professional life-we could each tell a story about choices we have
made, like McCoy's and like Brazil's, in which we try ever more
desperately to justify how we live.
McCoy's and Brazil's stories, however you read them, are
compounded by the existence of our own stories, and the stories we tell
when we talk about McCoy and Brazil. Stories add up.
Our stories matter. Stories matter and have power not because we
talk about them as we do or because we extract moral lessons from
them, but by the more infinitely subtle process of their shaping our
imagination and anchoring us against the undertow of an unbounded
adversarial zeal that teaches that we need not care for others.
VII.
We turn, after our encounter with the sadhu and the homeless
Archie, to another story, this one closer to home, the story of a lawyer,
Seymour Wishman.5 ' Wishman begins Confessions of a Criminal
Lawyer with the story of his confrontation with a woman named Mrs.
Lewis, who he had humiliated during cross-examination in a rape
trial. Wishman did not believe his client's story but still conducted a
brutal cross-examination for the purpose of helping his client avoid
conviction. 2 Wishman initially tries, as do many lawyers and
is. He remarked that virtue is "a settled disposition of the mind
determining choice, and it consists in observing the mean relative to us,
a mean which is determined by reason, as a person of practical wisdom
would determine it.
Jon Moline, ClassicalIdeas About MoralEducation, 2 CHARACTER 1 (1981).
51. WISHMAN, supra note 22, at 4-5.
52. Philip Corboy, the well-known Chicago litigator, divides crossexamination into two categories: "(1) that intended to impeach the witness or to
expose some fallacy within his or her testimony; and (2) that which has no
purpose other than degradation and humiliation of the witness." Philip H.
Corboy, Cross-examination:Walking the Line Between Proper Prejudice and
Unethical Conduct, 10 AMER. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 2 (1986). Corboy argues that
lawyers "must draw a line between legitimate impeachment and frank
humiliation. Sometimes impeachment must encompass witness humiliation, but
the initial decision to embark upon a degrading cross-examination requires
careful scrutiny of the target." Id. On the "classic question" of the "propriety of
(continued)
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students of law, to justify his humiliation of Mrs. Lewis. It is difficult
to admit to yourself that you humiliated another human being who
deserved better.5" Even more shocking, we learn that the reasons we
give ourselves for the humiliation are bogus.
Wishman offers an array of reasons for the humiliation, none, by
his own confession, adequate, ultimately, to justify the humiliation of
Wishman explains what he has done with the
Mrs. Lewis."
following reasons:
-I did it to be effective. It was my job. "I had done what a
criminal lawyer was supposed to do.'""5
-I was trained in law school to do it.
-I did not think about it. There was no time to think. I got caught
up in the trial as a contest.
-It was part of an elaborate game, a contest.
-I associated tough cross-examination with good craftsmanship.
It takes skill to "break" a witness.5"
-I made an effort to narrow my vision so I would not be overly
concerned about situations like this. "I tried," Wishman says, "as an
act of will, to limit my vision to what I actually did in the courtroom..
"57

-There

was nothing personal in it.

(The practice of law had

become a trade, a game, a contest, a battle.)

discrediting the adverse witness [in a rape trial] counsel knows is telling the
truth", Corboy admits it is not an easy question and the "result" casting doubt on
truthful testimony seems "harsh." Id. at 11. Corboy does not, however,
adequately use the two categories he has presented to frame his inquiry into the
moral concerns involved. He concludes rather lamely that "itis undesirable that
defense counsel should sit silently whenever he believes a searching crossexamination may be harmful to a prosecution witness." Id. at 12.
53. WISHMAN, supra note 22, at 4-5. Greenebaum, supra note 23, at 631-32
("The emotional pressures to view oneself as honest and honorable cause
practitioners to rationalize what they are compelled to do as ethical conduct, or
they are likely to find a new context in which to earn a livelihood.").
54. One Federal District Judge argues that "[cdross-examination based on
factually unsupported innuendo, irrelevance, or dissembling and hiding facts
are all hallmarks of the hardball advocate...." Joiner, supra note 8, at 16
(remarks addressed to cross-examination in the context of civil advocacy).
55. WIsHMAN, supra note 22, at 18.
56. Wishman takes pride in becoming good at what he is doing. He lashes
out at the incompetence of other lawyers, and even his own lawyering when he
loses control. Wishman is consumed with the idea of being a good lawyer.
57. Id.
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-There were personal, psychological reasons for doing it: ego
gratification, the need for power and control, the effort to secure
respect and admiration from those who observed my work.5"
-I was getting something more out of practicing law than I had
been willing to admit to myself. "Why," I finally ask, "did I find it
so thrilling?"59
-I
had failed to fully articulate the "high, even noble
expectations" that took me to law school. I had kept my thoughts about
justice quiet.6
-I followed the model of Judge Barrett, the judge that I had
clerked for after graduating from law school. Judge Barrett had
compartmentalized his life so that he could assume a role within the
system and ignore his deepest personal convictions. Judge Barrett
imposed the death penalty but had strong personal feelings about the
sanctity of human life. He gave harsh prison sentences, but believed
that the penal system was inhumane. Judge Barrett's personal
convictions and personal integrity, even his religious beliefs, are
walled off from his belief in the adversary system of justice.6 '
When we talk about Seymour Wishman's humiliation of Mrs.
Lewis with students of law, we find that some crave the opportunity to
badger, humiliate, and "destroy" witnesses on cross-examination.
Others are repulsed at the thought of doing what Wishman has done.
Wishman elicits both admiration and condemnation. Much of the
admiration for Wishman turns not on his searching moral inquiry
but on the fact the he plays hardball and tells a good war story. Others
disdain Wishman-not just his humiliation of Mrs. Lewis, but
Wishman himself-because they assume they, unlike Wishman,
will never succumb to the dark side of the adversarial ethic.
I take the self-assured arguments that Wishman makes about
doing his job to be a story that lawyers tell, a story that deserves close
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Judges, even as they witness first hand the abuses of the adversary
system, call for devotion to the system. See, e.g., Joiner, supra note 8. ("An
advocate must be more than just a hired gun for his or her client; rather, the
advocate must serve the system and the client at the same time."Id. at 7. "That
the duty to the administration of justice supersedes any claim of the client is a
professional obligation of the civil advocate."Id. at 9.); Martone, supra note 7, at
233 ("The Rules of Professional Conduct need to be amended to clarify that a
lawyer's duties to the system are equal to or greater than his or her duties to the
client."); Clement Haynsworth, Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C.L. REv.
627, 628 (1976) (The lawyer "owes [a] duty of loyalty to his client, but he has a
higher duty as an officer of the court.").
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attention. There is, Wishman learns, something wrong with the
moral vision reflected in his various "reasons" for humiliating Ms.
Lewis. (Remember it was Bowen McCoy's observation about his
Quaker anthropologist friend's committed "moral vision" that made
it possible for him to understand what was happening in their
encounter with the sadhu.) We need to inquire into how the lawyer
ethic makes it possible to humiliate a witness who tells the truth and
then claim that we are morally justified in doing so. Can we be
ethical and so cavalier about the truth?'
While Bowen McCoy is not a lawyer, and does not cross-examine
witnesses in a legal trial, his story is yet another kind of crossexamination, the kind we do with our friends and of ourselves. It is
possible to make a credible argument, based on the best of
philosophical sources, Socrates among them, that the kind of crossexamination that McCoy demonstrates is ultimately as important as
any we will ever do in the courtroom.
When we talk about the ethics of cross-examination, and the
ethics of the cross-examiner, we begin to see how lawyers get
entangled in an ethic that pushes them beyond moral limits. When
we watch lawyers at work we discern a difference between the ethics
of a lawyer like Atticus Finch and the ethics so many of us pursue
without understanding how a virtue like zealousness can become a
working pathology.
Wishman's reflections on his life as a lawyer provide a number
of clues to suggest how ethics work:
62. Those who puzzle over these practices of humiliation might juxtapose
Harper Lee's account in To Kill a Mockingbird of the cross-examinations
conducted by Atticus Finch and Mr. Gilmer, the prosecutor, in the Tom
Robinson rape case. LEE, supra note 11, at 177-81, 183-91, 198-201. Consider
also Atticus' humiliation of the Ewells to get at the truth in the Tom Robinson
rape trial and Wishman's humiliating cross-examination of Mrs. Lewis in
cavalier disregard of the truth. These juxtapositions bring the conversation
ethics around to talk about this elusive notion of truth and whether it has any
place in our lawyer jobs.
It is, of course, more than a matter of truth. Scout, Atticus' daughter,
recounting the events of the Tom Robinson trial, and Atticus' cross-examination
of Mayella Ewell, who has falsely accused Tom Robinson, says of the crossexamination: "Somehow, Atticus had hit her hard in a way that was not clear to
me, but it gave him no pleasure. He sat with his head down.... " Id. at 191. Even
Mr. Gilmer, the prosecutor, who takes full advantage of Maycomb's racism
(suggesting that he too may be part of Maycomb's "usual disease") "seemed to
be prosecuting almost reluctantly" a reluctance that does not diminish the
brutality of his cross-examination of Tom Robinson. Id. In these elusive
references we find a personal, subjective dimension of zeal that is seldom the
subject of inquiry or analysis.

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[20:735

Ethics pulls us into moral discourse by way of the "reasons" we

give for leaving the sadhu behind, or as in Wishman's case,
humiliating a witness we believe to be telling the truth.
Ethics calls us to be reflective, to engage in self-examination.
Ethics slows us down and interrupts the routine, habituated
patterns of everyday life.
Ethics helps us "see" how the system fails and helps us develop a
critical perspective.
Ethics helps us account for the moral choices we make.
Ethics helps us move beyond the subjectivity of personal opinion
and the claims of objectivity associated with conventional moral
rhetoric.
A. Giving Reasons
We do ethics and see ethics at work when we give "reasons" for
what we do. In giving reasons we account for the harm that others
(and we) attribute to our actions. Wishman finds it necessary to give
reasons for his humiliation of Mrs. Lewis.' Bowen McCoy found it
necessary to give reasons for leaving the sadhu and not staying
behind to care for him. Wayne Brazil reasons with himself (and the
reader) to understand how his life makes it possible to walk past
Archie, the homeless man, without better ministering to him.
Wishman, McCoy, and Brazil, upon reflection, come to understand,
and explain, and seek the reader's understanding of the reasons they
have used to explain the moral situations they find themselves in.
The reasons given, on reflection, fail. McCoy continues to feel
guilty. Wishman makes public his confession. Brazil laments the
moral drift that has resulted in his indifference toward Archie.
Their reasons may help explain what has happened, and how it
happened, but the reasons do not add up to a moral justification.
Wishman begins to see that his reasons are excuses and that what he
has been telling himself about what he does as a lawyer is part of what
might be called a cover story. Wishman, like so many of us, has
become blind to the everyday reality of the legal practices he has
adopted. (Wishman assumes that what he does in the courtroom is not
"personal".)
Wishman's competitive drive and intense desire to
win 64 have fueled his adversarial zeal. The obsession with winning,
allied with the idea that winning demonstrates competence, has
resulted in the displacement of other ideals and values that might
63. WIsHMAN, supra note 22, at 3-18.
64. See generally, The Zealous Lawyer: Is Winning the Only Thing? 4 REP.
CENTER FOR PHIL. & PUB. POLY. 1 (1984).
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have pulled Wishman in a different direction. Wishman has made
Mrs. Lewis into an object of an elaborate game, his "ferocity"
becomes a calculated courtroom performance, a game with "terrible
consequences on individual lives. '"65
Wishman describes one case in which he became convinced that
he had prosecuted and helped convict an innocent man, the horror for
any prosecutor with an ounce of moral sensibility. Using his best
skills, he had obtained a conviction in a doubtful case, a conviction
that had "elated-at first" but then troubled him."
[Aifter the initial excitement of winning, I looked at what I
had done. I had been so caught up in the contest, the
adversarial battle of the trial, that it had not occurred to me
that I might have been responsible for the conviction of an
innocent man .... On reflection, after the verdict, it seemed to

me that the defendant might have been telling the truth."
Wishman acknowledges that something has gone wrong68 and
that he must address "these new grievances" about himself.6 9 What

65.

WISHMAN,

66.
67.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.

supra note 22, at 17.

68. Wishman suggests a number of ways that things have gone wrong in
his life as a lawyer:
-He has lost sight of his own responsibility. Id. at 11, 17.
-He forgets the faces of those he prosecutes and represents. Id. at 14, 15. One
day in a hallway outside a courtroom Wishman runs into a defendant who has
been found innocent in a case that he has prosecuted. The man introduces
himself but Wishman has forgotten not only the man's name but his face.
"When I failed to recognize him [the innocent defendant] in the corridor by the
elevator, I told myself I had simply prosecuted too many cases-prosecuted too
many defendants who looked alike and committed the same crimes. I had
forgotten him...." Id at 14. And there are other incidents, the kind that remind
us that it requires a massive loss of memory to live on the lawyer fast-track.
It was around the time I met in the corridor the defendant whom I had
perhaps wrongly convicted that I decided to leave the prosecutor's
office. I'd been there for two years and had been thinking about
moving on for some time. One afternoon I found myself in the middle
of a summation in another case-calling for the conviction of yet
another scourge of society-when I realized I had forgotten the
defendant's name and the charge against him.
Id. at 15.
(continued)
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motivations have made it possible for him to humiliate a truthful
witness like Mrs. Lewis and become so enamored with gaining
convictions that he loses sight of the possible innocence of a
defendant? Wishman begins to see that he has used his power and
skill in a harmful way and then covered up the harm with
"flippantly" presented "lofty jurisprudential arguments" to justify
what he has done.7"

B. Self-Examination.
When the reasons no longer work, when Wishman sees that the
reasons are rationalizations used to disguise harm, and that he has
taken on a character he does not want, he finds it necessary to confess,
to figure out who he is and what he has become. Confessions of a
Criminal Lawyer is a story of one lawyer's moral self-examination.

-He cuts himself off from his ideals and his feelings. The more Wishman
plays the game and learns the skills necessary to win, first as a prosecutor and
later as a criminal defense lawyer, the more he becomes cut off from the ideals
(admittedly vague ones) that had taken him into law. "I .

.

. coped with my

feelings by putting them aside, out of the way of my professional judgments."
Id. at 42. He distances himself from the fact that he feels responsible for the
punishment of a criminal when he obtains a conviction. "Although they were
guilty-often of atrocities-I was even more disturbed than I expected to be by the
thought of anyone going to jail because of my skill. Unlike other prosecutors, I
wouldn't appear on sentencing day ..
" Id. at 14. Wishman tries to shield
himself from his concern about punishment and prisons so that he can
concentrate on getting convictions. But putting aside such feelings, necessary it
might seem to be to do the job, is part of a pattern that leads us astray.
-He develops stock answers for those who question what he is doing. Id at 14.
-He finds that he has no intimate relations with other people.
What had once been a shield of self-protection separating me from a
psychologically threatening criminal world had assumed the
pretension of a personal philosophy. The chances for intimacy with
new friends or new ideas had diminished slowly over the years without
my noticing it. With lower expectations of people and ideas, I could no
longer be disappointed easily. Aside from the self-defeating limits this
attitude imposed on my relationships, it was a depressing world view to
be alone with.
I& at 240-41.
69. Id at 239.
70. Id. at 17. Wishman later refers to the rhetoric that he has used to justify
humiliating Mrs. Lewis as "posturing". Id at 69.
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"[Flor the first time in my life, my habit of examining myself was
shifting from external details to the moral level."7 1
Ethics, if we can ever get beyond the notion that the study of legal
ethics is a study of profession prescribed ethical rules, is going to
require self-examination. We see ethics at work when we look
carefully, at ourselves; we see how our prized claims about ethics are a
shield for self-protection and rationalized practices that advance our
own interest and ignore those of others. The only way to know
ourselves is to examine what we are and who we are. Wishman says,
I had to examine in a disciplined way the sources of my
anger, the anger that was peculiar to me rather than to
criminal lawyers generally. I decided that one way to begin
this examination would be to write about it.
I had vague memories, hidden, it seemed, behind many
thin, finely spun curtains. I knew I would have to try to draw
the curtains back."
Wishman's confessions are an attempt to exhume the vague
purposes and ideals are guiding and shaping his sense of what he is
doing in the practice of law. He acknowledges that the purposes that
would redirect him and provide a more coherent ethical basis for his
life as a lawyer are vague and ill-defined. But vague as they may be,
they still represent, Wishman believes, a higher ideal than that
exemplified in his humiliation of Mrs. Lewis.
C. Slowing Down and Taking Account.
Ethics slows us down and disrupts the placid self-assurance that
all is well. I would have to screen my cases from now on. I had never
turned down a case because the crime or the criminal were
despicable-but now that would change. I could no longer cope with the
ugliness and brutality that had for so long, too long, been a part of my
life.
I also knew that I could not deal with the same volume of cases. I
could not constantly be in court, on my feet, arguing, fighting,
struggling to win. I needed to find a way to step back from the
aggression of the courtroom battles and the violence that was usually
the subject over which those battles were fought.73 Old explanations
71. Id. at 56. For a commentary on this process, see James R. Elkins, The
Examined Life: A Mind in Search of Heart,30 AM. J. JuRis. 155 (1985).
72. WISHMAN,supra note 22, at 241.
73. Id at 241.
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are reexamined when they no longer work. Wishman finally
concludes that he must try fewer cases, that he must slow down, think
about what he is doing and take responsibility for what he does as an
advocate. In slowing down we refocus on purposes (and identities)
that get pushed aside in the rush to be successful lawyers.
D. Becoming More Critical
Ethics helps us develop a critical perspective. We begin to see who
we are in the "system" and how the "system" has found its way into
our character.74 Wishman uses his skill to secure the conviction of a
man that he later decides is innocent. When Wishman confirms the
innocent defendant's story, a story he discredited at the man's trial,
he sets out to rectify the wrongful conviction. But the system seems
less interested in righting the wrong than it does covering it up. A
wrongful conviction is an embarrassment to the system, as
Wishman painfully learns.

74. The story that Wishman tells about Judge Barrett, the judge he revered,
is instructive on how lawyers become operatives for the system. On Judge
Barrett, see, id. at 7-9, 13. See also, Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas Shaffer, Hope
in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 569 (1979) (An account of a

lawyer who was an "insider" and retained his integrity.).
In puzzling over lawyer ethics we raise this question about being insiders
and holding on to our ethics. Can our ethics ever be anything other than the
operating standards of the groups in which we live out our working lives?
Michael Maccoby, in a suggestive observation, points out that
[tihe corporation is of course not fully responsible for the character
development of those who work there. Character is formed first in
family and school, and the type of person who chooses to work in a
corporation has some idea of what to expect. He or she enters with
character traits common to young Americans who pass all the exams
and get high grades at colleges and universities. The corporate
individual must be competitive and highly intelligent in terms of
intellectual problem-solving. But most young people are a mixture of
still-malleable attitudes. Upon entering the corporation, they still have
the chance to become more idealistic and just or they could become
disillusioned and self-serving. The traits stimulated in the corporation
will in many cases have a decisive effect on the kind of people they
become, not only as managers, but as citizens, husbands, wives, fathers,
and mothers.
MICHAEL MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN: THE NEW CORPORATE LEADERS 157 (1976).
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With my hands sweating as they clutched the papers, I ran
down the courthouse corridor to the judge who had presided
over the trial. I had expected him to be as upset as I was. The
judge said I had had no business meddling with the
conviction; our adversary system had separated roles: a
prosecutor should prosecute and a defense lawyer should
defend, and if I had doubts ...they should have been resolved
before the conviction.75
The trial judge reluctantly agrees to reopen the case but the matter
is not resolved. The public defender who represented the defendant
does not pursue the issue and leaves the matter for his successor when
he resigns his position to enter private practice.
Six months passes before Wishman learns that the conviction has
not been set aside. He contacts the new public defender assigned to the
defendant and urges him to move for a new trial. Eight months after
the trial the conviction is set aside.
When we work to keep the "system" going we assume we are
thinking of the "big picture". With a more reflective critical
perspective, Wishman finds that protecting the system may be a
worthy goal, but it became for him "too narrow and abstract a concept"
to provide him "with any comfort". "I had ignored the larger moral
and emotional implications of my actions."7 6 The "system" allowed
to trump one's own moral sensibilities is a "system" that will devour
US.
E. Making Choices.
It is hard to imagine a life as a lawyer without choices and it is in
the choices we make that we see ethics at work. Wishman sees that he
is constantly in the process of making choices when he tries a case
before a jury and that in these choices he is saying something about
the kind of lawyer and the kind of person he is. "There is no end,"
says Wishman, "to the possibilities for self-consciousness. Should I
smile? Should I get angry? Should I treat the D.A. with respect or
contempt? Should I demand that the jury acquit or should I beg
them?"77

75. WISHMAN, supra note 22, at 12.
76. Id at 69.
77. Id. at 70.
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F. Getting Beyond the Subjectivity of Ethics.
It is ethics that links the personal to the social, political and
spiritual.
Seymour Wishman's distress, induced by his
overdetermined attitude toward adversarial zeal, is personal but not
idiosyncratic. Wishman suggests that his concerns are related to the
moral concerns of the legal profession as a whole. "I sense that my
distress was not just a personal matter but revealed some of the
painful moral and emotional dilemmas of my profession.""8
We must try to relate what is going on in the personal way we
practice law to the ethics we have as lawyers because we are lawyers.
Our miscues, mistakes, and failures are openings into heightened
moral concern and evaluation of the pathologies of lives lived "in" a
profession.
VII.
A law firm is asked to seek delays in all cases involving a client
insurance company.79 The applicable ethical rules make clear (well,
relatively clear) that such delays are an infringement of justice;
whether they are a violation of the rules is another question. 0 In the
78. Id. at 18.
79. The problem goes something like this: the law firm represents AllNation Insurance, a wholly owned subsidiary of Good-Health Drug Company.
A five person law firm management committee makes policy decisions for the
fifteen member firm. The firm has two partners that spend 80-85 % of their
billable hours representing All-Nation in the settlement and trial of insurance
claims against the company. The two partners who handle the insurance
defense work are not members of the management committee.
The partners who handle litigation for All-Nation have asked the
management committee to consider the following: the General Counsel in the
Cleveland home office of All-Nation has forwarded the litigation partners a
memorandum informing them that Good-Health has become the target of a
recent effort in a leveraged buy-out and is drawing heavily on All-Nation
financial reserves to put together a strategy to block the buy-out. As a result AllNation has requested that local counsel (your law firm) seek delays in all
pending cases to avoid the possibility of adverse publicity and adverse cash flow
that would result from unfavorable jury awards. The General Counsel also
notes that the policy has been initiated as a result of substantial adverse cash
flow created by increased claims and a rash of million dollar plus plaintiffs'
victories.
The partners who represent All-Nation ask for advice of the management
committee?
80. The ethical rule on delay is a model of obfuscation. The rule turns out
not to be much of a rule: "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
(continued)
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law school conversation and argument that takes place about the
requested delay, we hear the many rhetorics of moral discourse at
work and get a glimpse at the Real World talk of lawyers:
Andy: First, let's define the problem.
Sue: Does it matter what the delays are for?
Andy: That's not the question. For me the question is
whether it is an ethical question or just a matter of policy.
Sue: It's an ethical problem.
Elizabeth: I think it's terrible that people have to wait for
their money because of what we are going to do. But then what
happens if we do not ask for the delay?
Roger: The company is lost, people lose their jobs, no one
gets paid.
Andy: It's not a matter of seeking illegitimate delays.
Delays work to the advantage of both sides.
Elizabeth: But even if the delays are legal it does not make
them right.
litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1983). This is certainly no rule meant to hold
water against the analysis of a law-trained mind: what constitutes reasonable
efforts? Is what is reasonable to be read, in all cases, "consistent with the interest
of the client"?
The rule does not bother to concern itself with the simple fact that
expediting litigation is often'not in the client's interest. The problem is addressed
not in the rule, but the comment to the rule. The comment provides that
[dlilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the
advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's
attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not justification that
similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is
whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the
course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay.
Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in
litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.
The sentiments of the rule and the comment seem to move in different
directions. If the aim of the Rules of ProfessionalConduct are clarity and brightline rules for lawyers, guidance on the ethics of the tactics of delay during
litigation fails dramatically. Yet, this is what the client wants, and if it is what the
client wants, we are pushed, as lawyers, to consider how it can be done. When a
law firm comprised of law students confronts this issue and begins their
deliberations we see how hard it is (even within what many students take to be
an unreal world of classroom moral discourse) to say no to a client.
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Andy: If it's legal, we can do it.
Roger: What is the benefit to anyone in speedily getting
into court?
Elizabeth: [Gives example of injured parties who need the
money.]
Roger: We're not talking about settling claims.
Sue: When one pays insurance premiums, they expect to
get paid when they file a legitimate claim. Can you not see the
harm that this will cause those who have filed claims that are
now being contested?
Andy: People may expect, with insurance, that they have
taken care of the problem, but in reality you are dealing with a
company.
Sue: If you pay flood insurance and lose your house in a
flood you are going to be outraged if you have paid all those
premiums for 20 years and then do not get paid.
Phillip: My perception is that they are not wanting us to
delay settlements in "legitimate" cases. It's a different issue
if we are talking about delay in cases where the plaintiffs
have legitimate claims.
Andy: If the company does not survive this cash flow
problem,. they'll fold.
Elizabeth: How can we help the most people? When people
sue they are trying to get more than they would when they
settle.
Phillip: No, that's not right. When you settle you get less
than you would if you litigated.
[An argument ensues about whether the firm will lose the
client if the firm does not do what the client as requested.]
Phillip: Is it up to the firm to decide about delays? Do not
judges make these kind of decisions?"1
As the conversation continues, Phillip, influenced by Andy's
adamant stance that there is nothing wrong in seeking the delays,
reminds the others, that it may, whether they like it or not, be
Necessary to do what the client has asked. (Necessary in these
conversations is always spoken with a capital N.) "We have to do
what the insurance company wants. It's our job. We'll lose the client
if we do not do it." When presented in this stark fashion, some
participants in the conversation pull back from a strong claim of

81. The conversation presented here is a condensed, edited version of an
actual conversation that took place in one of my legal ethics classes.
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Necessity, the demands of Role, and the amoral stance they are
struggling to understand and enact.
Sue focuses on the harm caused by the requested delays, and tries
to find a rhetoric that will personalize the harm so that her colleagues
can understand it as she does. Getting the delays the client "wants"
is basically, she observes at one point, "sleazy business". Andy
works assiduously to stay in the dark, as best he can, about the purpose
of the delay, the interests it serves, and the harm caused by such a
course of action. Even when informed by his colleagues what the
delay means, he is slow to take account of the consequences of doing
what the client wants.
There is, during the course of the conversational struggle, an
effort to find a practical compromise. The compromise is that they
will not go as far as the client (and Andy) wants, but then they will not
say no (as Sue urges), at least not outright. It is difficult to say no.
Some of us clearly do not have the character to say it when we must.
There is surprise and dismay when we hear what our colleagues
will do, the compromises that can be made, in the name of ethics.
There is also wonder at the courage of those who know their ethics,
think through a problem, and stay with what they know is right. It is
easy enough when we talk ethics to become confused and perplexed. If
you set out to explore the moral limits to lawyer zealousness, you will
be humbled by the obstacles you confront along the way.
VIII.
We turn our attention now to a client who is trying to figure out
what to do about a proposed Federal Food Administration (FFA)(a
hypothetical new Federal agency) regulation that would ban the use of
certain cancer-producing chemical preservatives in wine shipped in
interstate commerce.8 2 The vineyard owner has already treated half
of the present season's wines with a chemical that the FFA alleges to
be cancer-producing and is concerned that he will have to close down
the vineyard if he is unable to sell the treated wines before the proposed
regulation bans their shipment.
There is talk about saving jobs, of the possibility that the scientific
evidence used by the FFA to support the ban will later be shown to be
mistaken, and the always popular and logic defying notion that the
presence of so many "natural" cancer-causing agents makes it

82. I have adapted this problem from THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 136-40
(2d ed. 1981).
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foolish to worry about carcinogenic additives to the food and liquids
we consume.
If it is possible to use the legal system to get a sufficient delay in
the promulgation of the proposed ban on the sale of chemically treated
wines, the vineyard can sell the wine. Many students of legal ethics
assume (and then argue) that this is exactly what the client "wants"
and that the lawyer must of Necessity do what the client seeks so long
as it is legal. Others finally willing to draw the line express concern
about cancer-causing chemicals in our food: "This is simply going
too far and I will not do it. I will not represent a client and help him
actively harm other people-knowingly harm others. This carries
the idea of zealousness too far."
In response, proponents of the "I'll do whatever is legal for my
client" stance reply: "Everyone is entitled to their own opinion about
ethical matters. You decide not to represent the client. That is your
ethics. I will represent the vineyard owner. I do not see how my doing
so says anything about my ethics. My client's morals are not
necessarily mine. And I do not think representing the vineyard
owner and doing what he wants to do says anything about my
character. What I do in representing clients has nothing to do with
my politics or my character... 3
83. Lawyers, whatever their moral rhetoric, worry at times about their
character. Some lawyers worry that they will acquire traits of character which
they do not admire.
[Wihen one is schooled in the ways of thinking and modes of
comportment of a particular profession, one does not merely
appropriate a special skill. Rather, one's entire outlook including one's
senses of self, others, and the world, is radically enlarged, if not
fundamentally reshaped.... [Tihe typically intense, often anxietyladen, education and training, to which lawyers . . .are exposed,
characteristically induces in them a fundamental change in world-

view, a change in how they experience the meanings and significances
of human situations, as well as a change in the ways in which they
relate to them.
William F. Fischer, Lawyering as a Way of Life, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 671, 672 (1990).
On the moral nature of lawyer character, see, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Living
in the Law, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 835 (1987); Anthony T. Kronman, The Good
Lawyer: Judgment and Characterin Law Practice, YALE L. RPT., Spring, 1989 at
2.

To say that being a lawyer entails a kind of character may mean something
like-Japanese character is different from American character. Lawyers may,
as it turns out, develop during the course of their education, training, and work,
a kind of character (and they might not). Lawyers may, as a result of their
(continued)
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We have all heard this speech or a variation of it. "I do not think I
have right to impose my moral views on you, my client, or anyone
else. The limits of zealousness are a personal matter that every
lawyer must decide for herself. And when a lawyer decides one way
or another that resolves the matter. You cannot condemn a person for
living an ethic you do not like, any more than you can condemn
someone for having a different religion."
There is just enough truth in this speech to keep us marred in an
ethical muddle without ever inquiring into the nature of the muddle or
how it may be clarified. 4
training, their work, and their motivation in becoming lawyers, develop a
particular kind of"social character", a character that we present to the world as
a "legal persona" or mask. See James R. Elkins, The Legal Persona:An Essay on
the ProfessionalMask, 64 VA. L. REv. 735 (1978); JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW (1976). There is, I contend, a psychological dimension to

lawyer character, to the kind of personality that one develops in a profession like
law. (There is presently no academic field that concerns itself with a
psychology of professionalism.) On the moral psychology of character and the
lawyer role, see DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHICS 259-314 (1983).

84. On the nature of conversational muddles, see GREGORY BATESON, STEPS
TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 14-20 (1972).

This is the way, William Frankena, a philosopher, responds to the muddle
presented in the argument outlined in the text:

It seems clear that morality is a guide to life of a peculiar sort in that it
allows the individual to be, indeed insists on his being, self-governed in
the sense, not only of determining what he is going to do, but of
determining what it is that he should do.

But to say that a developed moral agent must make up his own mind
what is right, and not simply accept the dictates of an external
authority, is not to say that he can make a course of action right by
deciding on it, or that whatever life he chooses or prefers to live can be
claimed by him to be ipso facto morally right or good; any more than to
say that a developed rational man must make up his own mind what is
true, andinot merely accept the declarations of another, is to say that he
can make a statement true by believing it, or that whatever system he
chooses or prefers to believe can be claimed by him to be ipso facto
intellectually justified. Being autonomous does not mean being
responsible to no transpersonal standard in morality any more than in
science. In both cases one is involved in an interpersonal enterprise of
human guidance (in morality of action, in science of belief) in which
one is self-governing but in which one makes judgments ("This is right,"
(continued)
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It is hard to know what move to make make in the face of so much
well-intentioned resistance. s5
Ix.
We cannot think best of ourselves unless we know how to be
advocates and we cannot be advocates until we test the limits of our
skills. As lawyers, students, and teachers, we want to have the "right
stuff'. Many of us want, as Tom Wolfe said of the first test-pilot
astronauts, to "test the edge of the envelope". There is something, for
some of us, in becoming lawyers that suggests the possibility of testing
ourselves, of using law and our skills as lawyers as a test of our
moral imagination. Is it not the daring skill deployed in matters of
significance that draws us to law? Is there not something in law that
suggests not only Reality (that we mislabel as Necessity) but Myth?
The stakes are high. We are no longer talking about the kind of
game where it is a sports coach's hype that makes winning and losing
significant. When you get to know lawyers, read about them, and
watch them at work on television, you begin to get the idea that
winning and losing matter, and it matters not just because lawyers
have big egos, but because of what the lawyer represents and how
winning for some causes and principles calls us back to our ideals.
Our orientation to winning and losing is so fundamental a part of
lawyer culture that many of us go glassy-eyed at the implications that
winning is not the sole criteria of success.
"That is true") which one is claiming to be warranted by a review of the
facts from the impersonal standpoint represented by that enterprise
and shared by all who take part in it-a claim which is not merely an
assertion of what one chooses or prefers, and may turn out to be
mistaken.
William K. Frankena, Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education, in MODERN
PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION 316, 325-26 (John Strain ed., 1971).
85. Some of my colleagues have responded to the argument with
thoughtful essays and we might begin by reading them with each other and
with our students. See, eg., Warren Lehman, The Pursuitof a Clients Interest,
77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers
for the Justice of Their Causes, 18 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1157 (1987).

When we talk about lawyer zealousness we hear refrains of denial and
ignorance ("what has ethics got to do with this?"); moral narcissists ("my ethics
are just as good as yours"); and liberals ("we have evolved a system to
adjudicate disputes and the injection of morality doesn't help us preserve the
pluralism we have struggled so hard to preserve"). Each offers a different
perspective on the matter of resistance.
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It is the desire to win that gets Seymour Wishman into trouble. It
is winning, being a winner and living the life of the achiever, that
gets many of us into trouble. When you are winning, making-it, and
being acclaimed, awarded, venerated, there is little reason to be
reflective. 6 Good fortune is not a prod to self-examination.
How is one to learn the real price for ignoring the moral limits of
zealousness? First, it is clear that everyone is going to make up their
own mind about the cost of doing what lawyers do in the name of the
adversarial ethic. There is at present no inoculation against moral
malaise and misguided moral sensibilities. We are all free to make
fools of ourselves by becoming zealots with reputations as "hiredguns" and "shysters", so zealous and so guarded of our false
consciousness that we can not see the forest for the trees. (Some of us
will become outright "crooks" along the way.) Yes, we can police the
profession and weed-out (some) incompetents and punish lawyer
thieves who steal from their clients. We can banish the most
unethical among us from the profession. There are some bad apples
among us and we can seek them out and sanction them. But look at
who gets drummed out of the profession and one wonders whether the
few who get caught stealing clients' money and those who
demonstrate in the most explicit way their incompetence and
negligence constitute the real danger. We can sanction and disbar
the most egregious of the crooks and incompetents and still have
enough ethical misfits to plague the profession and give credence to
our reputation as charlatans and hired-guns.
We can mount media campaigns and teach the public to better
understand the legal profession and the adversary system. By more
effective use of the news media we can spruce up our image as a
profession. I do not know how gullible the American people are, and
whether they are susceptible to being told, by lawyers, that lawyers are
in reality fine public servants looking after the affairs of the republic.
The American public may already know something about lawyers
that lawyers have been unwilling to admit to themselves.
One wonders whether the legal profession, as a community, is not
becoming the kind of community that Atticus Finch's Maycomb had
become, divided and self-delusional, a community that does not know
the truth about itself, and when it hears the truth must deny it or
86. Tolstoy's Ivan flych is a good example of a lawyer, albeit a fictional one,
that makes a comfortable place for himself and then finds that his life is a mess,
that his comfortable life has come at an exorbitant cost. flych has followed the
well-worn path trod by others and learns that he must pay the price. LEO
ToLsTOy, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER STORIES 95-156 (New American

Library 1960). Self-deception is a costly ego-defense mechanism and lawyers
are common victims.
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dismiss it. The legal profession needs to listen to its Atticus Finches.
The legal profession needs to know that our critics are telling the truth
about us when they say that we are, in our efforts to take zealousness to
its adversarial limits-while promoting the adversarial system as a
system of justice-a problem to ourselves and the communities in
which we live. We need to be able to face up to the shadow side of
lawyering. The way to do it is to admit that there is occasion for
shame8" in our profession.
It may be overly dramatic to say that it is shame that is driving
lawyers from the profession, but something is. Paul Ciotti, a staff
writer for the Los Angeles Times, reported on a 1988 American Bar
Association poll that showed forty-one percent of a representative
sample of lawyers would choose another profession if they had to
make the choice again.8 8 Mr. Ciotti found lawyers frustrated with
paper work, ungracious colleagues, greedy clients, a slow and
adversarial legal system, boredom, overwork, public disdain for the
profession, and their own unrealistic expectations about the practice of
law. Basically, Ciotti notes that "[m]ore than ever before, 'many
lawyers say they are working harder, getting richer and enjoying it
less."89 Lawyers are flocking in astonishing numbers to careerchange seminars.
In recent years some corporations have conducted "ethical
audits" and we would be well advised to do something of this sort in
our law firms and law schools. Why are lawyers leaving the legal
profession? We might conclude that there is something wrong with
the work, something wrong with legal education, something wrong
with the limited ideals we now hold for ourselves as professionals.
It is not the money that is bothering lawyers," but something about
the work, about the profession, about the practice of law. Ciotti

87. On the re-discovery of shame in the world of psychology and
psychotherapy, see Robert Karen, Shame, 269 THEATLANTIC 40 (1992).
88. Paul Ciotti, in UnhappyLawyers, 1 ETHICS: EASIER SAID THAN DONE 54
(1989).
89. Id.
90. There is good reason to believe that lawyers are not dissatisfied with
the profession and seek to leave it because they are underpaid. While there has
been speculation that federal judges have left the bench because of miserly pay,
one might venture that this hype (actually, a kind of rhetoric) about inadequate
judicial salaries is the voice of the establishment looking after its own. There are
as many qualified lawyers willing to assume the bench at existing salaries as
there are federal judges willing to give up a life-time appointment and the
power and prestige attached to the office of a federal judgeship. Hundreds of
American law teachers, many who have continued limited law practices during
(continued)
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concludes that the general level of dissatisfaction in the legal
profession is high, perhaps an all time high.9
One gets a glimmer of one strain of moral pathology in the legal
profession when we listen-in on what is being said in law school
classrooms (which is what I have been doing in this essay).
During the several weeks that I talk with law students in a legal
ethics course about the adversarial ethic and whether there are limits
to what we can do in the name of zeal, I present students with a
problem about the negotiation of a lease agreement for a client when
the opposing lawyer is trying desperately to complete the negotiation
because he plans to take, his family to Europe on vacation (he has
super-saver tickets that make it costly to renege on the vacation). The
question, as it gets framed during the course of discussion, is whether
they will bargain for a "fair" settlement for their client or take
advantage of the other lawyer's plans. As one student put it, the issue
is either doing what is fair for both sides, or taking the other lawyer
and his client "to the cleaners" (using the language of adversarial
zero-sum game lawyering). There is little moral outrage expressed
when the argument is made that every lawyer, for every client, must
get all that can be gotten for the client. ("I mean really now, you imply
that we must not only look out for others, but we must look out for the
lawyer on the other side! This is absurd.")'
It becomes apparent in these discussions about zealousness and
from the way we imagine the role of zeal that zeal adopted as a solitary
virtue makes life hellish for lawyers. We make life hellish, not by
adopting the kind of zealousness that Atticus Finch had, but the kind
of zealousness that Seymour Wishman demonstrated in his
humiliation of Mrs. Lewis. It is the callous zealousness that we enact
that makes it possible to humiliate a witness like Mrs. Lewis and see
"nothing personal" in it. And it is the kind of dispirited zealousness
("just doing his job") that Atticus Finch's daughter, Scout, describes
when she explains Mr. Gilmer's racist comments in his crossthe course of their tenure as teachers, would be fully qualified to sit on the
federal bench, and willing to do so at existing salaries.
91. Ciotti points out that alcoholism among lawyers is almost twice as high
as for the general population. Ciotti, supra note 88. See Ted Rohrlich, Bar
Group Finds Lawyers' Alcohol Consumption Rising, PADUCAH

SUN,

Dec. 6,

1990, at 6A.
92. We have now progressed from laments about the "ethics" of lawyers
reflected in our treatment of others, to a concern-within the profession-of
how we treat each other. See, e.g., How's Your Lawyer's Left Jab? A New
Crackdown on Slimeball Litigation Tactics, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 70;
Milo Geyelin, Lawyer's Object to Colleagues' Rudeness, WALL ST. J., June 24,
1991, at B1.
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examination of Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird. Or it can be
the kind of zealousness that comes from having a purpose, as did
Bowen McCoy, that will get us over a Nepalese mountain pass and
leave behind a sadhu suffering from hypothermia. We make life
hellish for each other as lawyers because of an ethic that privileges
zealousness as the ultimate virtue. We burn-out as lawyers93 when
the ethic of zealous adversarialism wipes out the other virtues we need
to maintain a sane world and a decent profession.
X.
The decision about what we are to do and to be in our zealousness
is one we cannot escape. Students of law and ethics set out on an
escape route when they use relativism to defend a notion of partisan
advocacy that ignores all interests but that of the client. When
confronted, law students claim that the decision is a personal one,
slipping to embrace the relativist claim that we each have our own
ethics. It is a perversion of the tacit moral knowledge we share to say
of ethics: "You have yours and I have mine." This school of thinking
makes moral discourse an exercise in futility: When you say what
your ethics of advocacy are and hear my notion of mine, we have said
all we can say to each other. The inquiry ends. We are, if we follow
this logic of moral isolationism, indeed in a deep muddle.
The problem with moral relativism is not that it is wholly false,
but true enough to be appealing, true enough to crowd out the kind of
critical thinking we need to understand how ethics works in the life of
Seymour Wishman and in our lives. After all, if I do not have my
ethics and you do not have yours, where would that leave us? Who, if
not I, or God, will decide what is going to be ethical? Without some
version of moral relativism we seem to be thrown back to moral
absolutes, absolutes we assumed we had escaped in these "modern"
and "post-modern" times. And with absolutes we can, can we not,
expect dictators telling us what will be right and what will be wrong?
Are we not bound, in a democracy, and as devotees of individual
freedom, to the idea of everybody having their own ethics? Ethics
begins to look like an inflated way of talking about individual
preferences. ("I have my opinions and you have yours.")
Relativism, common and pervasive, cannot be ignored if we are
going to talk about lawyer ethics. And yet, some students are amazed
that anyone could question relativism as a moral stance. To do so
93. Martone, supra note 7, at 230 ("The lawyer loses faith in his own system
because everything he undertakes is problem avoidance rather than problem
resolution. This leads to great lawyer burnout.").
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they say is a form of dogmatism. Allan Bloom observes that when
moral relativism is challenged its character is "revealed" by "a
combination of disbelief and indignation: 'Are you an absolutist?,'
the only alternative they know, uttered in the same tone as 'Are you a
monarchist?' or 'Do you really believe in witches?" 4 Anyone
unwilling to accept relativism, warts and all, must be a dogmatist
intent on imposing their own ethics on others.9" The challenge to
relativism is met by a claim of dogmatism and authoritarianism. In
this view, if you are not a relativist then you are intolerant of other
people's views. The only way to be tolerant and fair is to accept every
ethical view (conflated or disguised as they may be in opinions,
preferences, interests, attitudes, and predispositions) as
representative of a worthwhile moral stance. Relativists believe,
Bloom argues, that "[rielativism is necessary to openness" and that
tolerance of other views is the only virtue that separates us from
dogmatism.
"Openness-and the relativism that makes it the only plausible
stance in the face of various claims to truth and various ways of life
and kinds of human beings-is the great insight of our times."'9 6 The
challenge to relativism is viewed, by those challenged, to be
illegitimate and a danger to the compromises of liberal tolerance.
XI.
Lawyers (and students, even before they have any realistic sense
about what lawyers do in the much vaunted Real World) claim that it
is the job of lawyers to represent unpopular clients (clients who have
engaged in reprehensible conduct or clients who are disfavored in a
particular community because of notorious moral views unacceptable
to the community). 97 We want lawyers to exercise independent

94. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER
EDUCATION HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S
STUDENTS 25 (1987). I cite Bloom's point about relativism without adopting the
more reactionary claims he makes about the academy.
95. By challenging their relativism my students assume that I am an oldfashioned absolutist, concealing my moral agenda in the guise of moral
discourse.
96. Bloom, supra note 94, at 26.
97. The prototypical case is an American Jewish lawyer who defends
Nazis. See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE
CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 2 (1979) ("I supported free speech for Nazis

when they wanted to march in Skokie in order to defeat Nazis. Defending my
enemy is the only way to protect a free society against the enemies of freedom.")
(continued)
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judgment and have the strength of character to represent clients that a
community might prefer go unrepresented or represented in a pro
forma way. The amoral zealous advocate takes the idea of
independence and freedom of lawyers to represent whomever they
want and the pride we take in those lawyers who represent unpopular
clients and assumes that this means that lawyers should represent all
clients, whatever their cause, and without regard to the client's moral
purpose. 98
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct promote the moral
legitimacy of this stance by noting that "[a] lawyer's representation of
a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social, or moral views or activities."9 9 The
comment to Rule 1.2 notes that
Id. at 1-2.) Neier recognizes that his position seems to present a paradox, which
he sets out to untangle in his book.

David Goldberger, an ACLU lawyer, who is Jewish, said of his successful
efforts to defend the right of a small group of Nazis to march in a heavily Jewish
Chicago suburb, "I don't think Ill ever look back on it without remembering the
pain it caused.... The hardest thing was being at odds with people for whom
you had strong feelings of empathy." Lawyer Who Aided Illinois Nazis Recalls a
'Very Difficult Odyssey', N. Y. TIMES, April 29, 1979, at 56. Goldberger reported
that throughout the court fight "he was vilified, threatened with physical harm
and forced several times to move his wife and children from their house." Id.
Goldberger found the beliefs of Nazi leader, Frank Collin, "absolutely
disgusting" but could not find another lawyer to take the case. Goldberger
agreed to represent Collin because "the case raised classic questions about the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly." Id.
For a law school dean's explanation to his students of why he has
undertaken the representation of Dr. Bernard Bergman, who had been widely
vilified in the news media, see MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETIcs App., A to A-12 (1990) (In his accounting to law students, Freedman does
not rely on the argument that every person is entitled to a lawyer. Freedman
rejects the notion that "a lawyer is bound to represent everybody who walks in
the door. That is not true and never has been true." Id. at A-i).
98. It is an ethic that teaches us to mistrust everyone (excluding ourselves)
and assume that all purposes, so long as they are sanctioned by law, are equally
meritorious in their claim for scarce cultural and psychic resources. If law is to

be the measure of moral concern, then every lawyer's ethics must be treated as
good as any others so long as it is legal/constitutional. For an intermediate
position, see ARONSON & WEICKSTEIN, supra note 29, at 11 ("While a lawyer is
under no obligation to act on behalf of every person who seeks his services, the

professional obligation to make legal services fully available to all who may
need them requires that there be at least one lawyer willing to represent every
potential client.").
99. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1983).
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legal representation should not be denied to people who are
unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is
controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the
same token, representing a client does not constitute approval
of the client's views or activities. 00
The commentary seems to be saying two things at once: It is good
(that is, something we should do) when we represent unpopular
clients. I take this to mean that it was morally good for lawyers to
represent the targets of Senator Joseph McCarthy's communist smear
attacks during the early years of the Cold War with the (former)
Soviet Union. It was morally good for lawyers to represent the cause
of civil rights workers and African Americans living in the South
during the years of the desegregation effort. It was morally good for
lawyers to represent conscientious objectors during the early years of
the Vietnam War before the tide of public opinion had turned in
support of the anti-war effort.
But what does it mean to say, as the commentary to Rule 1.2 does,
that it is "[bly the same token" (of our resistance to popular pressure in
the community) that we represent those who reflect the most debased
moral views of the community? My students, the most amoral among
them, realize that lawyers (whether of Necessity or Choice) become
identified in one way or another with their clients. Yet, we also know
that lawyers represent all kinds of people, for all kinds of purpose,
without taking up the clients' purposes as their own. A lawyer who
represents a defendant charged with killing a policeman (a
decidedly unpopular client) does not advocate violence against
policemen, or murder in general. Some lawyers are clearly more
moral than their clients, while the client's morality can become the
measure of the lawyer's ethics. (Some clients are more moral than
their lawyers, and are introduced to schemes and ploys of dubious
moral value by their lawyers.) The point is not that it is clients that
lead lawyers from the path of righteousness (as they sometimes do) or
that lawyers must become moral judges of their clients causes
(although they sometimes are). The point is that moral inquiry into
zealousness requires that we know that zealous advocacy, like any
virtue, can be transmuted into a vice.
The primary culprit (and accompanying ethical muddle) is seen
in the compartmentalization that makes possible the notion that the
ethics we have as lawyers do not count as the ethics we have as

100.

Id. at Rule 1.2 cmt.
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persons.' 0 ' We find convenient the idea that we can set aside our
personal morals and take up the professional amorality of the
adversarial ethic. We assume this is necessary to live with the
cognitive dissonance created by the image of ourselves as good
lawyers (when good means no more than successful and successful
means a lawyer who will play whatever games lawyers play to get
ahead) and good persons (a person who can claim with pride to be a
lawyer and to be doing the the work that lawyers do).
Atticus Finch escaped the trap by living the same ethics at home,
with his children Jem and Scout, as he did in town, as a lawyer.
Scout, Atticus' six-year-old daughter, when informed that things
happen behind closed doors that are secrets, tells Miss Maudie, a
neighbor: "Atticus don't ever do anything to Jem [her older brother by
some five years] and me in the house that he don't do in the yard."'0 2
Later at the rape trial of Tom Robinson, Scout is trying to explain to
Dill, one of her friends (the kids have, without Atticus' permission
sneaked into the courthouse to see Atticus try the Robinson case), why
Atticus and Mr. Gilmer, the prosecutor, treat their witnesses
differently on cross-examination.
Mr. Gilmer refers to Tom
Robinson as "boy" and attempts to humiliate Tom Robinson in the
eyes of an all-white jury by insinuating that a black man's word
cannot be believed when it is refuted by a white woman."' Atticus on
the other hand "humiliates" Mayella Ewell, the prosecutrix in the
rape case, and her father, Bob Ewell, in showing the jury (and the
reader) that Mayella and her father are lying. It is difficult to
conduct a successful cross-examination of lying witnesses without
humiliating them. When Scout tries to explain to Dill, why he is sick
to his stomach at the way Mr. Gilmer treats Tom Robinson and not
bothered by Atticus' cross-examination, the best answer she can give
is that Atticus is "the same in the courtroom as he is on the public
streets."'0 4 Atticus does not have one set of ethics at home and another
at the courthouse just as he did not have a set of ethics for dealing with
Scout and Jem when the neighbors were looking on and another set
when he was dealing with them at home behind closed doors.
Atticus, for all we know and assume, did not compartmentalize
his life. Atticus took his sense of himself as lawyer home and used
101. There are "moral risks" to this assumption. The problem is that we then
lose the ethics we have as persons that would keep us straight as lawyers. See
Huff, supra note 9, at 50-51 (pointing out how compartmentalization leads to the
sort of "blindless" where we do not perceive that we are doing wrong and fail to
recognize the moral issues present in our professional lives).
102. LEE, supra note 11, at 50.
103. Id. at 200.
104. Id. at 202.
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his lawyer's sensibility to raise his children. And it can be argued
(neither Atticus nor Harper Lee do so explicitly) 'that Atticus treats
Mayella and Bob Ewell the way he does, getting at the painful truth in
the Tom Robinson case, because he takes the patience and gentleness
that he has at home with Scout and Jem to the courtroom (and to the law
office) with him.
Atticus would, if I read his character right, scoff at the idea that
there is something called professional morality that can (or must) be
compartmentalized that makes it possible to act like two persons
rather than one, one person at the office and in the courtroom and
another at home with his children. The idea of ordinary morality (the
morality of common folk) and professional morality (the morality of
special folk like lawyers) is something that we have cooked up to
explain modern day notions of lawyering and lawyer ethics. The
idea that we can make sense of lawyers and their ethics by devising
two disconnected worlds, one for ordinary moral concerns and
another for professional morality, is more reactive than reflective,
more excuse than justification. What we imagine to be ethics of two
worlds (or "two kingdoms" as Thomas Shaffer called them)"0 56
becomes, as it always must, one ethic, an ethic for a schizoid world.
The expedient splitting of professional and private life, giving to each
its own form of morality makes us schizoid.
The intellectual compartmentalization of morals reflects a deeper
psychological splitting that helps us keep the shadow side of
professionalism at arms length. 0 7 In law, as in life, we take the
persona to be real, and the shadow something found only in the "bad
apples" of the profession. As one law student put it, "Every profession
has unethical practitioners but this does not mean that there is
anything wrong with the profession." The student was trying to ward
105. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms, 17 VAL. U.
L. REV. 3 (1983).
106. Thomas Shaffer, ChristianLawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics,
33 MERCER L. REV. 877, 885 (1982) ("We practice our profession with a disabling
discontinuity between who we are and what we are doing. Too many lawyers
try to do that, and they end up in misery, or alcoholism, or repentance.").
107. The shadow is a term that psychologist C.G. Jung used to denote those
elements of our conscious lives, both negative and positive, that have been
repressed, denied, ignored, and (tentatively) forgotten. The shadow is masked
by a persona, that is both consciously and unconsciously selected and presented
to others as the "self' we want the world to see. For Jung's explanation of the
shadow, see AION- RESEARCHES INTO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SELF
(Herhard Adler et al. eds., R.F.Hull trans., 2d ed. 1968); ROBERT H. HOPCHE, A
GUIDED TOUR OF THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG 81-85 (1989). See also

ROBERT BLY, ALITTLE BOOK ON THE HUMAN SHADOW

(1988).
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off the disturbing idea that when lawyers are unethical it is a
reflection on her and her profession. A bad lawyer (whether bad in
the sense of competence or bad in the sense of morals, or bad in the
sense of both) is just one bad lawyer. You cannot, this student argues,
make arguments about the goodness of the legal profession based on
the lawyers who have gone astray. You can not let the bad lawyer
influence your view of the good that lawyers do. Psychologically, the
student was protecting her cognitive choice to be a lawyer and do what
lawyers do, even doing what lawyers do when they are most frowned
on by the public by using ego defense mechanisms: denial (the legal
profession is not in trouble), rationalization (the argument that bad
lawyers do not signify a bad profession), and compartmentalization
(bad lawyers/good lawyers). The student confirms her persona, the
legal persona necessary for deployment of the adversarial ethic, and
denies the presence of the shadow, the moral impulse that tells us to
respect and care for others regardless of what name we give the work
we pursue, what we call our job, or who is paying the fare.
But covering the tracks that we make during the process of
splitting ourself (into persona and shadow) and our lives (into
lawyers and the person we are at home) is more difficult than it
appears when it verbally is pronounced. Few of us can maintain a
consistent and deliberate persona that successfully manipulates
others into seeing us as we wish to be seen. It is one thing to learn to
keep a straight face playing poker, yet another to keep the persona in
place, shielding us from our own shadow and from the shadow of the
profession. One may with practice, perform a straight poker face; it is
more difficult to live a persona.0 8
We want to think that the right hand can act in a way that does not
reflect on the left hand, that the left hand need never be implicated in
what the right hand does. The right hand of Necessity may feed the
108. The shadow, regardless of how careful and deliberate we try to keep it
in its place. The shadow has a life of its own. The more the shadow is disowned
the more energy it has in our life. The more effort we put into maintaining the
persona the bigger the wall necessary to keep the shadow in its place. The
greater the fear that we will be found to be something more or less than we
claim to be, the less we become at the shadow's behest. The shadow, having its
own existence, takes up, seemingly on its own initiative, an other-worldly,
denied, subterranean existence. And most importantly, having a life of its own,
the shadow acts on its own initiative, separate and apart from the ego's desire to
be in control, and proves to the world that we are what we have told the world
we are. We become the split person. We become compartmentalized into
professionals and private persons (the functional side of compartmentalization).
We become compartmentalized into persona and shadow (the psychological
and pathological side of compartmentalization).
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left hand of private moral existence, but what the right hand feeds us
cannot be digested without consequences for the character we become
in the process. Right and left hand are assumed to function on
different bodies, that is, we embody the one ethic (of a so-called
professional morality, amoral and purposeless, or purposeful in the
direction of extreme zealousness) with the one hand and the ethic of
caring and concern,10 9 respect and integrity, a hand that exists on the
same body. The lawyer then wonders why she feels torn, split,
fragmented; why she does not feel whole and complete; why each day
seems to move her toward burn-out and emptiness, each day defined
by the struggle to resist giving-up and giving-in.
XII.
What we are talking about is zealousness, no longer empowering,
a zealousness that forgets itself, frozen into a rationalized philosophy
of cruelty. Absent the character of Atticus Finch, zealousness
practiced unreflectively requires increasingly more energy to
justify. But first denial seems sufficient. We are simply unwilling
to see the choices we make as having anything to do with, or deserving
of moral inquiry. "I simply do not see this as an ethical problem," we
say when confronted with the most obvious moral dilemmas. If we do
not see the problem we do not worry about ethics. We do not worry
about our zealousness as lawyers because we find it more convenient
(and conventional) to proceed on ethical "automatic pilot". If we do
not know what we are doing in the name of zealousness and use our
zealousness unconsciously (willfully and arrogantly) then our
adversarial ethic will take us astray. Knowing that some of us will
engage in professional malevolence and get away with it sets us to

109. As a result of the work of Carol Gilligan the ethic of care is both widely
known and debated in legal education circles. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFERENT VOICE (1982). For further elaboration of the ethic of care see, NEL
NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION
(1984). Gilligan's work, and the ethic of care, have received widespread
attention in feminist moral theory. See, e.g., WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Eva
F. Kittay and Diana T. Meyers eds. 1987). Feminism and feminist moral theory
have recently been presented as a critique of lawyering and lawyer ethics. See,
e.g., NAOMI R. CAHN, A PreliminaryFeminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEO. J.
LEG. ETHICS 23 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Some Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S

L.J. 39 (1985).

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[20:735

wondering.11 °

What some of us will do in the name of zealousness
makes a mockery of ethics.
Whether you would or would not take zealousness to its limits
depends on who you are and where you are, on your character,
common-sense, and self-image. A lawyer who is a trout fisherman
might be unwilling, on what he takes to be personal moral grounds, to
represent a company dumping pollutants into a trout stream. People
who love old homes and lament the sorry spectacle of living in
suburbs of blandness will not readily represent a real estate developer
who wants to level historical homes and build an apartment complex.
There will always be lawyers who counsel the vineyard owner
against the use of the legal system to help him sell chemical-treated
wines suspected as cancer-producing agents. And there is always, if

we are lucky, someone who will see how doing what the client asks us
to do is morally wrong, regardless of the fact that it can be done and he
will get away with it and make money doing it. Some lawyers will
refuse to seek a delay when the corporate client wants one simply to
put pressure on a party to settle; some lawyers will even think it

Necessary to do it and then find a way not to do it."'
Each of us much choose." 2 One of the choices we make is how we
are going to adopt and adapt this ethic of zealousness to make it fit our
character. The judgment that character makes possible, and the
character of that judgment, are central to good lawyering and any
110. We do not know-I do not know-what to do about someone who sets
out to do wrong in the name of right, evil in the name of good, when no law has
been broken. There is much to despise and condemn that falls outside the realm
of the prohibited and the criminalized. To create a perfect fit between law and
morality would be to create a perfect hell.
The values of a reasonably just society will reflect themselves in a
reasonably just law. The better the society, the less law there will be. In
Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.
The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an unjust law.

The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be
nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.
0

("Law reflects but in no
sense determines the moral worth of a society. " (paraphrasing HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 36 (Howe ed., 1963))).
111. For an interesting commentary on why business men and women
remain honest, even when the market-place seems to support dishonesty, see
GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977)

Amar Bhide & Howard H. Stevenson, Why Be Honest If Honesty Doesn't Pay,
68 HARv. BtS. REV. 121 (1990).

112. Some students of lawyer ethics argue that when you decide to be a
lawyer you have already decided your ethics and little more need be said.
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advocacy that claims moral worth. Without the kind of judgment we
first learn (and continue to practice) as judgment of character we
would be not only morally awash but professionally inept.
XIII.
There are those who claim that while the image and life of Atticus
Finch is an exemplary one, his story is not relevant to the lives of
today's lawyers. There is resistance to the kind of common-sense
moral notions Atticus exemplifies. It is possible to defend against the
simple moral lessons (ah, you say, "there is nothing simple in matter
of morals and ethics") that Atticus teaches. First, many of us are not
interested in moral lessons; we do not think we need them, and we are
not likely to identify the moral teaching of the lessons that come our
way. If we are not looking to examine the moral fabric of lawyering
when it is pointed out to us, we probably will not take kindly to
instruction as to the texture of the moral weave of lawyer work. We
see best what we are looking for, what we already see well.
Even if we are open to moral teaching, to the lessons,
demonstrations, and exemplars of good character (and are able to
admit that there can be teachers of morals), these lessons must come at
the right time, and in the right way. Then, and only then, are we
willing to take account of the morals and ethics we are constantly in
the process of learning and using, learning and failing to use, using
without knowing how we have learned them.
Even in ideal circumstances there are obstacles to accepting the
truth of Atticus' life that we can fashion a moral life without
compartmentalization, Seymour Wishman's confession is presented
to show that compartmentalization is false and the better it works the
more pernicious it may turn out to be. Some readers of To Kill a
Mockingbird complain that the picture of Atticus we get is from the
eyes of a child and consequently must be taken with a grain of salt.
After all, as one student put it (in assertive law school fashion) "we do
not know what Atticus would do in a different situation other than the
ones we are shown in the novel." For this student, Atticus'
willingness to endanger his children's and his own well-being to
defend Tom Robinson is an incidental matter. We can never know
what Atticus would do if he were placed in the situation we are in
today, says this student.
We know a good deal more about Atticus Finch than the student is
willing to admit. We may know as much about Atticus as we know
about any actual living lawyer. (Many law students enter law
schools without any acquaintance with lawyers, real or fictional,
except the ones they know from television.) We know more about
Atticus than we know about the lawyers we accept invitations to
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practice with, and perhaps more than we know about ourselves. We
know where Atticus came from and who his people were. We know he
was "Maycomb County born and bred" 13 and that he knew the people
of Maycomb and that they knew Atticus. The Maycomb, Alabama, of
the early 1930s is the kind of place where the cliche-everybody knows
everybody else-is more than a cliche. We know Atticus' neighbors
and we know Calpurnia, who takes care of Scout and Jem while
Atticus is in town being a lawyer. We know something about the
Black community in Maycomb, and something about how the Black
community is organized around the Black church that Calpurnia
attends. We know something about the church because Calpurnia
takes Scout and Jem to church and we learn how that turned out." 4
Basically we know Maycomb, as a community and a troubled one, a
community deformed by racism. We know what Atticus thinks about
Maycomb and how, his regard for this place of his people must be
reconciled with its racism.
It is with and in all this that we know Atticus and know something
is wrong with the student's argument that we do not know what Atticus
would do if presented with the kind of "real" problem that lawyers
who take the adversarial ethic seriously face. It is what we know of
Atticus that allows us to say that he has character, a character stalwart
enough to make his adversarial ethic only a part of his character.
What the student cannot admit and is unwilling to concede is that we
do indeed know Atticus and what we know is that he has character
beyond his legal persona and that his character helps us speculate
about what he and we would and would not do in the name of an
adversarial ethic. Atticus has the kind of character that all of us
would like to have (or so many of us that it seems fair to say all of us).
Even those who do not aspire to be like Atticus are not eager to admit to
the implications of the impulses that would have us put Atticus and his
character aside in our study of lawyer ethics.
The student goes on to point out that Atticus is a "fictional"
character and that it is not realistic to try to live up to the moral
standards of a fictional lawyer hero portrayed through the eyes of a
child. This argument, like the amoral stance on the issue of
zealousness, is another example of compartmentalization: there are
Real people and there are characters in fiction; a Real World and a
world of fiction. The characters in fiction are not real and therefore
can have no real claims on us; characters of fiction can have no
moral weight in our efforts to figure out how to live our own lives.
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Once we learn to psychologically compartmentalize our lives we
find it handy for all sorts of purposes. Compartmentalization appears
to offer protection of the moral character we have already adopted. It
is convenient that Atticus, and his character, are fictional and can so
easily be set apart from our Real World concerns. Your problem, the
student tells me during our discussion of Atticus, is that you take
Atticus too seriously. You act as if Atticus were real, you forget that he
is not.'
This brief, but intense, classroom dialogue raises interesting
pedagogical, ethical and epistemological issues. What is a teacher to
do when a student asserts that they cannot be expected to have
character as a lawyer? What are we to do when young initiates of the
legal profession assume that the adversarial ethic is the only one they
will need to be a good lawyer? And is that not what we hear and see in
the legal profession? In response, I hold to the reality of Atticus Finch
and his character. We know that Atticus has character because we
know him, his neighbors, and how his neighbors respect him: they
send him off to the legislature in Montgomery even though Atticus is
different, reads all the time, is a bit detached, walks when everyone
115. There are diverse intellectual strategies available to those who seek to
avoid learning what Atticus has to teach. The argument, a composite of those I
have heard over the years, goes something like this:
Why should I believe that any person can have the kind of character
that Atticus does? And if such character is possible, what reason is there

to believe that anyone today would be interested in trying to be like
Atticus? And even if someone among us could imagine herself being
like Atticus, it is not me.
There are many ways to be good. We don't all have to be good like
Atticus. It is good that we are not all like Atticus and it is good that I do
not particularly want to be like him. I can be good in my own way. It is
in the many ways that we are different in our moral perspectives and
the many ways that we are good that makes for a lively world. We
should not set up Atticus as the moral beacon for all lawyers. Who
knows what kind of problems and dilemmas we are going to face? And
is it not harmful to create unrealistic expectations about the kind of
character one might have as a lawyer? What is going to happen to

your self-image when you hold up Atticus Finch as the image of the
good lawyer and find that you cannot live like Atticus? Atticus is a
fictional creation.
No real person who has the character that Atticus Finch has. The

way I see ethics cannot be held up against a fictional portrayal of
character, or for that matter held up against anyone's determination of
what it would mean to be a good lawyer. There are no heroes (moral
saints) to tell us what our ethics should be.
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else has given up walking for riding around in automobiles, and
disturbs the community profoundly in the zeal he devotes to
presenting a truthful defense of Tom Robinson, confronting the
community with its racism. We know Atticus and we know that
Atticus knows his own mind. Atticus has, as Thomas Bolt said of Sir
Thomas More, an "adamantine sense of his own self."11
The defense against learning ethics from Atticus may be one of
those situations where what we know about another person is simply
too threatening to the choices we are making to accept. To accept
Atticus, to understand his character, and to accept the possibility that
we need a character like Atticus' to be an ethical lawyer is going to
come hard to those who think it possible to learn lawyer ethics from a
rule book, to be zealous without regard to the costs.

116.
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